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CLOSING THE COURTROOM FOR
UNDERCOVER POLICE WITNESSES:
NEW YORK MUST ADOPT A
CONSISTENT STANDARD
Robin Zeidel*
INTRODUCTION
On one routine evening, an undercover narcotics officer moved
on foot through a neighborhood known for drug activity, attempting
to buy narcotics.' In unmarked cars parked nearby, the back-up
team of officers listened to his commentary into a hidden radio
transmitter.' The undercover officer asked a young man on a
bicycle for a "twenty."3 The man led him to a cocaine dealer
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1997. The author wishes to thank Mary
C.R. Davis, Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, for her assistance in the
preparation of this Note; U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck, Southern
District of New York, for his insights and guidance and my husband, Ronnie, for
his encouragement and love.
Michael Connelly, Street-Level View of the War on Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1992, at B3 (describing a series of buy-and-bust operations during a
"four-hour Wednesday evening sweep" by undercover officers in the San
Fernando Valley, Los Angeles). In a police buy-and-bust operation, an
undercover police officer poses as a narcotics buyer. After buying the drugs, the
officer communicates with a nearby back-up team, which then arrests the seller.
Ruben Castaneda, D.C. Police Chief Bars "Buy-Bust" Drug Tactics: Action
Taken in Wake of Fatal Shootout, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1992, at DI; Elliot
Zaret, Police Units Deal Blows to Drugs via "Buy/Bust, " COM. APPEAL, June
11, 1995, at IA. The undercover officer may then "drive-by" to identify the
seller. E.g., People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 439, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1028,
604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (1993).
2 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
3 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
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waiting outside a sandwich shop.4 The officer exchanged marked
money for a "small, pale rock."5 He walked away, saying into his
transmitter, "It's a go. It's a go." The unmarked cars rushed in to
arrest both the dealer and his "director"6 on the bicycle.7 By the
end of their four-hour shift, this narcotics team handcuffed five
suspects from different operations and placed them in the back of
their van.8 For the officers, this was a "slow day."9
When prosecutors try arrests such as these in court, their main
witnesses are often undercover officers."° Undercover officers are
commonly concerned that by testifying against a defendant arrested
4 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. As a result of increased arrests of street-
level drug dealers, the undercover officers noted, "it is becoming rarer for buyers
to directly approach a dealer." Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. Instead, dealers
hire "directors" or "steerers" with bicycles, buzzers or walkie-talkies to
"sheperd[]" customers to dealers and "act as lookouts for customers as well as
police." Connelly, supra note 1, at B3; Matthew Purdy, Drug Turf Is Safer As
Dealers Avoid Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at Al. Undercover officers
must persuade the director to lead them to the dealer. Connelly, supra note 1, at
B3.
Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
6 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
7 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
9 Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. The police had hoped to fill their 15-
passenger van by the end of the night. Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. However,
the police considered themselves lucky because they learned through informants
that one of the men they arrested was a major dealer. Connelly, supra note 1, at
B3.
The buy-and-bust operation described above is typical. See, e.g., Zaret,
supra note 1, at 1A (describing a buy-and-bust operation consisting of a drug
purchase by an undercover officer who poses as a junkie and an arrest of the
street sellers moments later by 10 police officers, ultimately resulting in the
arrest of 25 people in 12 operations in one night); Report & Recommendation
at 2, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) ("As part
of a police 'buy and bust' operation, [undercover] Officer Fisher bought the
narcotics from [petitioner] Brown, then radioed other officers, who arrested
Brown minutes later.").
10 United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1273 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 73, 286
N.E.2d 265, 266, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911
(1973); People v. Boyd, 59 A.D.2d 558, 559, 397 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (2d Dep't
1977).
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in an undercover narcotics operation, the officers will expose their
identities to the public, thus jeopardizing their own safety and the
integrity of their ongoing undercover operations." An undercover
officer may have other pending investigations, perhaps near the site
of the arrest in the case at trial. 2 The officer's undercover unit
may also target friends or family of a defendant, who are likely to
view the trial. 3 The part of the courthouse where the trial takes
place may be dedicated to predominantly narcotics cases, so that
other spectators may recognize the officer.'4 The officer may have
" Martinez v. Sullivan, No. 88-CV-7335, 1989 WL 63103, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1990); People v. Brown, 214 A.D.2d
579, 579, 625 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 732, 655
N.E.2d 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1995); People v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d 742, 743,
616 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d
126, 622 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994); People v. DeChirico, 185 A.D.2d 282, 282, 586
N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 974, 605 N.E.2d 879, 591
N.Y.S.2d 143 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 942 (1993); People v. Brown, 172
A.D.2d 844, 845, 569 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (2d Dep't 1991); People v. White, 170
A.D.2d 629, 629, 566 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d
1002, 575 N.E.2d 414, 571 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1991); People v. Weaver, 162 A.D.2d
486, 487, 556 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 868, 561
N.E.2d 907, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1990); People v. McLennon, 156 A.D.2d 478,
548 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (2d Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 921, 554
N.E.2d 77, 555 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1990); People v. Wharton, 143 A.D.2d 958, 958,
533 N.Y.S.2d 557, 557 (2d Dep't 1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 921, 549 N.E.2d 462,
550 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1989); People v. Tinsley, 145 A.D.2d 448, 448-49, 535
N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (2d Dep't 1988).
12 E.g., Vincent, 520 F.2d at 1273 (noting that undercover officer was active
in same county as arrest); Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d at 73, 286 N.E.2d at 266, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 887 (noting that undercover officer was active in same community
as arrest).
13 People v. Dorcas, 630 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 87 N.Y.2d
845 (1995) (noting that the undercover officer feared an open courtroom because
he "attempted to make drug purchases in that area [the site of defendant's
arrest]," so that "the defendant's family or friends could very well point him out
as he attempted to make another buy"); People v. Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d 541, 542,
606 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 963, 639 N.E.2d
756, 616 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1994) (noting that the undercover officer stated that "he
feared an open courtroom because 'one of [the defendant's] friends' from whom
he was currently purchasing drugs might be there").
14 People v. Gross, 179 A.D.2d 138, 140, 583 N.Y.S.2d 832, 832-33 (1st
Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 832, 600 N.E.2d 643, 587 N.Y.2d 916 (1992)
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received threats connected with work on undercover operations. 5
All of these factors may cause an undercover officer to fear that
public testimony will result in exposure of his or her identity.
In New York State, these concerns of identity exposure and
jeopardy to ongoing undercover operations have led prosecutors to
request closure of courtrooms to the public during the testimony of
witnesses who are undercover police officers.16 These requests are
often granted by trial judges, and the closing of courtrooms during
such testimony has become a "routine practice" in New York State
narcotics cases, primarily in New York City.'7 The closing of
courtrooms during the testimony of undercover police officers
directly conflicts with defendants' countervailing constitutional
right to a public trial.'"
(quoting the trial court, which found compelling that its part heard "almost
exclusively" narcotics cases, so that "it is likely that someone could come in here
who might have dealt with the undercover or who might deal with her in the
future").
"5 E.g., Woods v. Kuhlman, 977 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the
defendant's family member threatened the undercover officer).
16 See, e.g., supra note 11 (indicating cases where courtrooms were closed
due to concerns of identity exposure and jeopardy to ongoing operations).
" The closing of courtrooms during testimony by undercover police
officers has become a routine practice in New York drug cases, "even
in penny-ante buy-and-bust cases," according to Jeffrey A. Udell of the
Office of the Appellate Defender, who represented the defendant in
[People v.] Gutierez [86 N.Y.2d 817, 657 N.E.2d 491, 633 N.Y.S.2d
470 (1995)].
Gary Spencer, Court of Appeals Limits Closing of Courtrooms, 214 N.Y. L.J. I
(1995).
"s The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. "This very fundamental right was one of the first Sixth Amendment
rights held by the Supreme Court to be an essential element of due process and
therefore applicable in state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1009 (2d ed.
1992) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). In Anglo-American tradition,
secret trials of the Spanish Inquisition, the English Court of Star Chamber and
the French monarchy "obviously symbolized a menace to liberty." In re Oliver,
333 U.S. at 268-69. "The guarantee [of a public trial] has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution," by operating as "an effective restraint on possible
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The closure of courtrooms during the testimony of undercover
police officers is strictly a New York phenomenon. In other
jurisdictions, where undercover officers face the same dangers as
those in New York, the pattern of closing the courtroom has not
developed."9 As very few courts have considered the issue,2" one
may infer that it is rarely raised. One possible explanation is that
other jurisdictions have eliminated the need to close courtrooms
during undercover police testimony. In Washington, D.C., for
example, police officers work undercover for short periods of time
because of regular appearances in open courtrooms. 2'
abuse of judicial power." Id. at 270.
'9 In the following cases, for example, the court noted that at trial an
undercover officer testified that he or she had purchased narcotics from the
defendant without noting courtroom closure: Ex parte State (Re: Kennedy v.
State), No. 1941731, 1996 WL 29458, at *1 (Ala. Jan. 26, 1996); Jones v. State,
No. A95A2669, 1996 WL 51125, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996);
Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 658 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), review
denied, 661 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1996); Carvajal v. State, No. 04-94-00680-CR,
1995 WL 595802, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1995).
20 In recent years, few courts outside New York considered the issue of
closing the courtroom during the testimony of undercover officers. See State v.
Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325, 326 (Wash. 1995) (considering whether closure of
pretrial suppression hearing during testimony of undercover police officer
violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the Washington State
Constitution); People v. Seyler, 494 N.E.2d 267, 270 (111. App. Ct. 1986) ("[W]e
conclude, as have the New York courts, that shielding the identity of a police
witness, preserving his future usefulness, and safeguarding his life provides an
adequate justification for excluding the public for that limited period while an
undercover agent is testifying.").
2 "[Washington, D.C. Police Department] Lt. Mario Sevilla, the 5D Vice
[C]ommander, cautioned all undercovers when they came into the unit that the
assignment was only temporary, that in a year or so, because of frequent court
appearances, too many drug boys would recognize them, and they would have
to be replaced." Paul Duggan, Anatomy of a Sting: Greed and Fast Money Made
a Dozen Dirty Cops Easy Pickings for the FBI, Who Snared Them in "Operation
Broken Faith, " SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 22, 1995, at 8. The Los Angeles Police
Department has assigned Black officers to undercover work for two-week
periods, explaining that "fresh faces" are needed so that "drug dealers and other
suspects are less likely to identify undercover officers." David Freed, LAPD:
Despite Gains, Race, Sex Bias Persist, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1986, at 1.
However, detective assignments in the LAPD's narcotics division are full time
and generally long term due to overtime pay and other benefits. Id; see also
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In New York, however, the practice of closing the courtroom
to protect undercover officers' identities has been in place since
People v Hinton.22 In Hinton, the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that the testimony of an undercover narcotics officer was an
exception to the general right to a public trial.23 In People v
Jones,24 the court of appeals further ruled that courts may not
close the courtroom during the testimony of undercover police
officers for "less than compelling reasons, ' 2s thus requiring a
factual showing of a threat to the witness's safety or to the integrity
of other cases. 26 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Waller
v Georgia,27 developed a stringent four-part test to determine
when closure is proper during a suppression hearing: 28 (1) "the
Dennis Hevesi, Detective Dies in Shooting in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1993, at BI (reporting that an undercover officer who was killed in a buy-and-
bust operation had worked in the same undercover unit for approximately four
years).
22 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 911 (1973).
23 Id. at 74, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The New York Court
of Appeals noted that targets of the undercover officer's investigations were
present in the courtroom, and stated: "While we reaffirm the inherent discretion-
ary power of the trial court to close the courtroom, we need only point out that
the discretion be sparingly exercised and then, only when unusual circumstances
necessitate it." Id. at 75-76, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
24 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 946 (1979).
25 Id. at 414-15, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
26 Id. at 415, 319 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363. The court ruled that
the "defendant's trial was improvidently closed to the public" where the court
relied "on its own unparticularized impressions of the vicissitudes of undercover
narcotics work in general. That undercover work at times entails serious threats
to the safety of agents was by no means sufficient to connect that threat to this
witness." Id.
27 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
2' A "suppression hearing" is a "challenge to the seizure of evidence [that]
frequently attacks the conduct of police and prosecutor." Id. at 47. In the
majority of jurisdictions, a suppression hearing follows from a pretrial motion to
suppress, usually required for "exclusion based on all grounds relating to the
illegal acquisition of the evidence." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 500.
A minority of jurisdictions require the defendant to object at trial when the
prosecution attempts to introduce the evidence. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
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party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced;"29 (2) "the closure must be
no broader than necessary to protect that interest;"3 ° (3) "the trial
court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the pro-
ceeding 3 ' and (4) the trial court "must make findings adequate to
support the closure. 32 Following Waller, the New York Court of
Appeals expressly applied its test to closures during trial testimony,
and required a fact-sensitive analysis of the specific nature of the
threat posed to the witness.33
However, despite the New York Court of Appeals' ruling, many
lower New York courts continued to employ the looser "compelling
reasons" standard of People v Jones, rather than the test estab-
lished in Waller.a4 New York state courts upheld closure merely
18, at 499.
29 Waller, 476 U.S. at 48.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 48. See infra parts III and IV for an in-depth description and
analysis of the Waller test.
31 In People v. Kan, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the Waller
test is the means "by which to assess the propriety of closure." 78 N.Y.2d 54,
57-58, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1044, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (1991). The court of
appeals then applied the test to review the trial court's decision to close the
courtroom during the trial testimony of a cooperating accomplice. Id. at 56-57,
574 N.E.2d at 1043, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The court ruled that the closure
violated the defendant's right to a public trial. Id. at 59, 574 N.E.2d at 1044-45,
571 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39.
" For example, the following cases referred to the vaguer "compelling
reasons" standard adopted in People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 414-15, 391
N.E.2d 1335, 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979):
People v. Brown, 172 A.D.2d 844, 845, 569 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (2d Dep't 1991);
People v. White, 170 A.D.2d 629, 629, 566 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (2d Dep't),
appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 1002, 575 N.E.2d 414, 571 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1991);
People v. McLennon, 156 A.D.2d 478, 478, 548 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (2d Dep't
1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 921, 554 N.E.2d 77, 555 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1990);
People v. Bowden, 156 A.D.2d 372, 373, 548 N.Y.S.2d 328, 328 (2d Dep't
1989), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 731, 557 N.E.2d 1189, 558 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1990); People v. Tinsley, 145 A.D.2d 448, 449, 535 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (2d
Dep't 1988). Despite the fact that in Waller, the Supreme Court implicitly
overruled the Jones court's "compelling reasons" standard with the four-prong
test, these New York courts continue to apply the weaker Jones standard.
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if the officer actively worked undercover,35 particularly if the
officer was active in the same general geographical area as the
arrest or the trial,36 which is an easier burden than Waller. This lax
" Brown, 172 A.D.2d at 845, 846, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 209-10 (upholding
closure where the undercover officer was "actively engaged as an undercover
officer" and "reasonably expected that she would be working in the same
community where she was about to testify," having applied for a transfer);
People v. Contino, 153 A.D.2d 948, 948, 545 N.Y.S.2d 754 (2d Dep't) (noting
that closure proper where undercover officer was "still engaged in pending
investigations, and closure was necessary to protect his safety as well as the
integrity of the ongoing operations"), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 769, 551 N.E.2d
112, 551 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1989); People v. Legette, 153 A.D.2d 760, 761, 545
N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (2d Dep't) ("[O]ne of the testifying officers ... was still
active in an undercover capacity, thereby sufficiently establishing that closure
was necessary . . . ."), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 949, 549 N.E.2d 486, 550
N.Y.S.2d 284 (1989); see also James F. Fagan, Jr., Close that Door! Closure of
Courtroom During Testimony of an Undercover Police Officer, 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 619, 635 (1992) ("Few state courts, however, have applied the Waller
test to determine whether to close the courtroom during an undercover agent's
testimony. Possibly the ambiguous language of cases reviewing the decisions of
trial courts to close courtrooms diluted the effect of the Waller test."); Abraham
G. Gerges, A Judicial Dilemma, 211 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1994) ("Until the decision in
People v. Martinez, courtroom [sic] were routinely closed based on such
testimony [as that of the undercover officer in Martinez]."); John M. Leventhal,
Public Trial: Keeping the Undercover Undercover, 208 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1992)
("Although the courts formally reject a per se exception for an undercover
witness, a showing of almost any factor will justify closure."); Suppression
Motion Is Granted After Officer Declines to Testify; People v. Edwin Gonzalez,
Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Part 43, Justice P. Williams, 208 N.Y. L.J. 21
(1992) [hereinafter Suppression Motion] (concluding after a review of New York
law up through People v. Kan that "the law of this State is currently the same
as that of Hinton and Jones in resting this issue in the sound exercise of judicial
discretion, and requiring that that discretion be carefully exercised to ensure that
closed proceedings are conducted only when absolutely warranted by unusual
circumstances").
36 E.g., People v. DeChirico, 185 A.D.2d 282, 282, 586 N.Y.S.2d 25, 25 (2d
Dep't 1992) (noting that officer testified "that his personal safety in the same
geographical area where the defendant was arrested would be jeopardized if his
identity as a police officer were revealed"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 942 (1993);
People v. White, 170 A.D.2d 629, 629, 566 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (2d Dep't 1991)
(noting that undercover witness was still working "in the community"); People
v. Sierra, 169 A.D.2d 682, 683, 565 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
78 N.Y.2d 974, 580 N.E.2d 426, 574 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1991) (noting that
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standard threatened to become an impermissible per se rule, where
the court could automatically close the courtroom for any active
undercover officer. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the
specific issue of closing the courtroom for undercover witnesses in
People v Martinez,37 and reemphasized the Waller test and its
requirement of a strong factual basis for closure.3 s
undercover officer was "still operating as an undercover police officer in the
same community as defendant's arrest"); People v. Carter, 162 A.D.2d 218, 219,
556 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (Ist Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 984, 565 N.E.2d
521, 563 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1990) ("[T]he witness's testimony that he currently
worked as an undercover narcotics agent in the area provided a sufficient factual
basis to seal the courtroom."); People v. Weaver, 162 A.D.2d 486, 487, 556
N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (2d Dep't) (ruling closure proper where undercover officer
"testified that ... investigations pending in the same geographical area where the
defendant was arrested would be jeopardized if his identity as a police officer
were revealed"), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 868, 561 N.E.2d 907, 560 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (1990); McLennon, 156 A.D.2d at 478, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (ruling that
closing proper where, inter alia, the undercover witness "was assigned to
ongoing investigations [in the Brooklyn North Narcotics Area] and would be
required to testify in Brooklyn courts with respect to those cases"); People v.
Santos, 154 A.D.2d 284, 285, 546 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1st Dep't 1989) ("Active
engagement in the community as an undercover narcotics agent is itself a
compelling reason for excluding the public from the courtroom. . . ."), appeal
denied, 75 N.Y.2d 817, 551 N.E.2d 1245, 552 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1990); People v.
Bostick, 150 A.D.2d 707, 708, 541 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (2d Dep't 1989) (ruling
closing proper where the "undercover officer was still operating in the
community"); Tinsley, 145 A.D.2d at 448, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 416-17 (ruling
closure proper where, inter alia, the undercover witness "was still actively
engaged in undercover work and was participating in operations in drug
investigations in Kings County," the site of defendant's arrest); People v.
Wharton, 143 A.D.2d 958, 958, 533 N.Y.S.2d 557, 557 (2d Dep't 1988) (ruling
closure proper where, inter alia, the undercover officer "was still working in an
undercover capacity with some 200 pending cases, some of which were in the
same geographical area as the 'buy and bust' case on trial"), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d
921, 549 N.E.2d 462, 550 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1989).
17 82 N.Y.2d 436, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1993).
38 Id. at 442-44, 624 N.E.2d at 1030, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 935-37. The court
cited the Waller test, stating, "Since Jones... the United States Supreme Court
has further particularized the standard for closure under the Sixth Amendment,
which we recognized in People v. Kan . . . ." Id. at 442, 624 N.E.2d at 1030,
604 N.Y.S.2d at 935. It ruled that the prosecution's "perfunctory showing in
Martinez was insufficient to meet the standards for closure repeatedly insisted
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Since Martinez, New York courts have applied a variety of
standards: some citing all four prongs of the Waller test,39 others
addressing only certain prongs,4° others following Martinez but
not acknowledging the Waller test,4 others continuing to apply
older, implicitly overruled standards42 and others failing to
upon by this Court and the Supreme Court." Id. at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604
N.Y.S.2d at 936.
31 See, e.g., People v. Green, 627 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't 1995); People
v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d 742, 742-43, 616 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d 126, 622 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994); People v.
Tapia, 207 A.D.2d 286, 287, 615 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d 1228, 621 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1994).
40 For example, the following cases ruled that the closure order did not meet
the second prong of the Waller test, which requires that the closure order must
be "no broader than necessary to protect" the overriding interest. These courts,
however, did not address all four prongs of the Waller test. People v. Carrington,
633 N.Y.S.2d 47, 47-48 (2d Dep't 1995) (ruling that the closure was broader
than necessary); People v. Pankey, 631 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (2d Dep't 1995)
(same).
4 The following cases cited Martinez to support closure under the specific
factual circumstances, but did not apply the Waller test: People v. Abdul-Aziz,
628 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1st Dep't) (ruling that closure was proper where the
undercover officer had "ongoing operations in the general vicinity of the crime,
which also was the vicinity of defendant's residence, as well as the ease of
transportation between the neighborhood and the courthouse"), appeal denied, 86
N.Y.2d 788, 656 N.E.2d 601, 632 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1995); People v. Ocasio, 628
N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (1st Dep't) (ruling that the courtroom was properly closed
where undercover officer was "still active in that capacity in the specific area
where defendant was arrested"), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 845, 658 N.E.2d 232,
634 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1995); People v. Rosario, 214 A.D.2d 345, 345, 625
N.Y.S.2d 19, 19 (1 st Dep't) (ruling that closure was proper where, inter alia, the
undercover officer was "on call to return to the specific area of the instant sale"),
appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 801, 656 N.E.2d 614, 632 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1995);
People v. Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d 541, 542, 606 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (1st Dep't)
(noting that closure was proper where the undercover officer was active in the
"neighborhood where defendant was arrested," and feared that "'one of [the
defendant's] friends' from whom he was currently purchasing drugs might be [in
the courtroom]"), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 963, 639 N.E.2d 756, 616 N.Y.S.2d
16 (1994).
42 The following cases applied language from People v. Jones despite the
fact that it was implicitly overruled: People v. Brown, 214 A.D.2d 579, 579-80,
625 N.Y.S.2d 570, 572 (2d Dep't) (ruling that "the factual showing went beyond
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identify any specific standard at all.43 Generally, the New York
State appellate courts are quite sympathetic to the concerns of
undercover officers, and uphold closure by the trial court in the
majority of cases.44
The approaches employed by the New York State lower courts
are inconsistent with one another, with the rulings by the New
York Court of Appeals, and with that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The lower New York State courts acknowledge Martinez only by
'unparticularized impressions of the vicissitudes of undercover narcotics work in
general,"' quoting People v. Jones), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 732, 655 N.E.2d
710, 631 N.Y.2d 613 (1995); People v. Parker, 194 A.D.2d 335, 336, 598
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1st Dep't 1993) (ruling that closing was improper where the
court did not make "'an inquiry careful enough to assure the court that the
defendant's right to a public trial is not being sacrificed for less than compelling
reasons,"' quoting People v. Jones); People v. Tinsley, 145 A.D.2d 448,449, 535
N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (2d Dep't 1988) (ruling that closure was proper because
"compelling reasons to close the courtroom were clearly established," citing
People v. Jones).
4' The following cases did not cite to any New York Court of Appeals or
U.S. Supreme Court cases for a controlling standard. People v. Cid, 629
N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st Dep't) (ruling closure was proper where the undercover
officer was "still active in the very area where defendant was arrested"), appeal
denied, 86 N.Y.2d 872, 659 N.E.2d 776, 635 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1995); People v.
Andrades, 215 A.D.2d 304, 627 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't) (ruling closure was
proper where the undercover officer "had numerous cases pending from
purchases which he had made in the area after the instant crime" and had
received threats), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 840, 658 N.E.2d 227, 634 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1995).
44 E.g., People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
86 N.Y.2d 788, 656 N.E.2d 601, 632 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1995); People v. Dorcas,
630 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 87 N.Y.2d 845 (1995); People v.
Rosario, 214 A.D.2d 345, 625 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 86
N.Y.2d 614, 656 N.E.2d 614, 632 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1995); People v. Aguayo, 200
A.D.2d 541, 606 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 963, 639
N.E.2d 756, 616 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1994); People v. Skinner, 204 A.D.2d 664, 612
N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d 1227, 621
N.Y.S.2d 527 (1994); People v. Jackson, 171 A.D.2d 756, 567 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d
Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 967, 580 N.E.2d 419, 574 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1991); People v. White, 170 A.D.2d 629, 566 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2d Dep't), appeal
denied, 77 N.Y.2d 1002, 575 N.E.2d 414, 571 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1991); People v.
Carter, 162 A.D.2d 218, 556 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 984, 565 N.E.2d 521, 563 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1990).
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requiring a stronger factual basis for closure than was commonly
deemed appropriate before the court of appeals' decision, thus
implicitly acknowledging the defendant's countervailing right to a
public trial.45 In this way, the New York Court of Appeals largely
succeeded in averting the development of a per se rule in the lower
courts that would allow automatic closure for any active undercover
officer. But the lower courts still have not complied with the
requirements of the Supreme Court's decision in Waller,46 even
though in Martinez the New York Court of Appeals expressly
adopted the test for closures during undercover witness testimony.
In contrast, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviews
state court decisions upholding closure during the testimony of
undercover officers on habeas corpus petitions,47 it uniformly
applies the Waller test.48 Courts in the Second Circuit must
4' The following cases followed Martinez but failed to apply Waller's four-
prong test. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 273; Dorcas, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 796;
Rosario, 214 A.D.2d at 345, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 19; Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d at 541,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
46 See, e.g., Dorcas, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 796; Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 273;
Rosario, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 19; Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d at 541, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 695;
Skinner, 204 A.D.2d at 664, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
47 Under the habeas corpus statute, persons convicted of crimes under state
law may bring a claim in federal court arguing that their incarceration is in
violation of federal law or federal constitutional law. The habeas corpus statute
provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994). In the closure context, the qualifying law is the
Sixth Amendment. The statute does not "limit the relief that may be granted to
discharge of the applicant from physical custody." Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 238-39 (1968).
48 See, e.g., Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 778 (1995); Burton v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL
669908, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995); Pearson v. James, No. 94-CV-1499,
1995 WL 617331, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1995); Ayala v. Speckard, No. 94-
CV-7850, 1995 WL 373419, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995); Okonkwo v.
Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571, 574, 577-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Daniel v. Kelly, No. CV-
78-830E, 1990 WL 130523, at *6-7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1990); Ip v. Henderson,
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synthesize their own caselaw with New York State law that does
not always comply with the Waller test and the rulings of the New
York Court of Appeals.49 Other complications faced by federal
courts when reviewing New York state court decisions include
evaluating whether claims have been exhausted or procedurally
barred.5° To protect fully both the defendant's right to a public
trial and the undercover officer's concerns, New York's courts
should consistently apply the Waller test.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the buy-and-
bust operation,5 and the consequent increased reliance on the
testimony of undercover officers.52 Part II describes the New York
State and Second Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that developed
the practice of closing the courtroom during the testimony of
undercover witnesses. In part III, this Note examines the Supreme
Court decision Waller v Georgia,53 which outlines a stringent
four-part test governing such closures. Part IV focuses on the
application of the Waller test in the lower state and federal courts.
In conclusion, this Note criticizes New York State courts for their
failure to adopt the Waller test in full as a means of protecting both
defendants' right to a public trial and the undercover officers'
710 F. Supp. 915, 917-19 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 888 F.2d 1376 (2d
Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Sullivan, No. 88-CV-7335, 1989 WL 63103, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1990); Jones v. Henderson,
683 F. Supp. 917, 923-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
49 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 579 n.20.
50 Id. at 574-79.
51 See supra note 1 (defining the buy-and-bust operation).
52 When buy-and-bust operations cases come to trial, the undercover officer
is often the prosecution's primary witness and may be the only witness to
identify the defendant as the narcotics seller. E.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v.
Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1273 (2d Cir. 1975) ("At trial, the State's primary
witnesses were two undercover officers from the Narcotics Squad of the Nassau
County Police Department."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); People v.
Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 73, 286 N.E.2d 265, 266, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1972)
("[P]rosecution's main witness was an undercover agent who posed as an addict
when making the narcotic purchases from the defendant."), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
911 (1973); People v. Castro, 63 A.D.2d 891, 405 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (1st Dep't
1978) ("The defendant's conviction at trial rested almost exclusively on the
damaging testimony of the undercover officer.").
13 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
concerns for safety, and recommends a strategy to ensure their full
compliance with Waller.
I. THE BUY-AND-BUST OPERATION AND UNDERCOVER
OFFICERS
The issue of courtroom closure for undercover officers
commonly arises in cases stemming from buy-and-bust oper-
ations.54 In this police tactic, uniformed officers arrest street drug
dealers after they sell narcotics to undercover officers posing as
buyers. 55 In New York City, the police department has recently
directed attention to street drug dealing as part of its attack on
many low-level crimes.56 As a consequence, the police arrest more
drug dealers,57 and the testimony of undercover officers regarding
their roles in buy-and-bust operations can be crucial during the
trials of these dealers.58 However, undercover officers may fear
that their testimony in open court will expose their identity, thus
threatening their safety and their ongoing investigations.5 9 Prose-
cutors, therefore, commonly request that the trial court close the
courtroom to the public during the testimony of these undercover
officers, primarily in buy-and-bust cases.6"
As in other communities fighting the war on drugs, 61 New
" See supra note 11 (providing cases in which the trial judge closed the
courtroom due to an undercover officer's concerns of identity exposure and
jeopardy to ongoing operations).
" See supra note 1 (defining the buy-and-bust operation).
56 See William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 447-48 (1995).
" Samson Mulugeta, Drug War's Smaller Battles Drug War's Little Battles,
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 1995, (Suburban), at 1.
58 See supra note 10 (citing cases in which an undercover officer is the
primary witness for the prosecution).
'9 See supra note 11 (providing cases in which the trial judge closed the
courtroom due to an undercover officer's concerns of identity exposure and
jeopardy to ongoing operations).
60 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing courtroom closure
during the testimony of undercover officers in New York State narcotics cases
as routine, primarily in New York City).
6 Police departments in communities outside New York City also employ
buy-and-bust operations to combat drug offenses. See, e.g., Bill Bryan, A
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York City has recently increased its reliance on buy-and-bust oper-
ations,62 where uniformed officers arrest street sellers of narcotics
after undercover officers buy drugs from them.63 Under Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani's Administration,64 the New York City Police
Department adopted an aggressive style and new tactics65 to target
Thankless Job Is Strangely Attractive: No Shortage of Candidates for Police
Chief of St. Louis, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 1995, at lB (noting that
in 1989, in response to complaints of blatant drug dealing, the St. Louis Police
Department assembled an undercover narcotics unit to buy drugs from street
dealers and has made more than 5000 arrests); Connelly, supra note 1, at B3
(reporting thousands of arrests made by street narcotics team in the San Fernando
Valley, Los Angeles); Phillip J. O'Connor, Twenty-Three Arrested in Drug
Dealing Probe, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at 67 (reporting that undercover
officers in Chicago arrested 23 alleged drug dealers during an eight-month
investigation in which the officers made 88 street-level buys of narcotics on eight
targeted street comers with "an estimated street value of $40,000"); Alan Travis,
Met Claims Success in Tackling Drugs Without Public Disorder, GUARDIAN, July
12, 1995, at 5 (reporting that in Brixton, U.K.-a place that was "once a byword
for drug dealing and urban riot"-police reduced drug trafficking in part via
purchases by undercover officers); Zaret, supra note 1, at 1A (explaining that in
Memphis, Tennessee, buy-and-bust operations were disbanded in 1993 and then
resurrected in 1994).
62 Clifford Krauss, Giuliani Sets New Policy to Spur Drug Arrests by
Officers on Beats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al (reporting that one of the
New York Police Department's new initiatives included "teams to conduct
aggressive buy and bust operations against illegal drug and gun dealers"); Elaine
Rivera, Campaign '93: Blast ofApplause for Rudy's TNT Plan, NEWSDAY, Sept.
22, 1993, at 28 (noting that then mayoral candidate Rudolph Giuliani
"promis[ed] to return to the [Ed] Koch [A]dministration policy of making
massive arrests of street-level dealers" using undercover buy-and-bust operations,
a tactic that was abandoned during the David Dinkins Administration). The buy-
and-bust operation is one integral part of the police's strategy to drive narcotics
dealers out of New York City. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, POLICE
STRATEGY No. 3: DRIVING DRUG DEALERS OUT OF NEW YORK 6 (1994)
[hereinafter POLICE STRATEGY NO. 3].
63 See supra note 1 (defining the buy-and-bust operation).
64 Mayor Giuliani was elected in 1993, defeating David Dinkins by 53,581
votes. Giuliani Won by 53, 000, Final Official Tally Shows, Associated Press Pol.
Service, Dec. 10, 1993, available in 1993 WL 5598954.
6' The increased reliance on buy-and-bust operations is in marked contrast
to the strategies of Mayor Dinkins' Administration, during which police directed
their efforts at higher levels of the narcotics trade. The Dinkins Administration
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all crimes, including relatively minor "quality-of-life" violations66
"abandoned" the Tactical Narcotics Teams ("TNTs")-buy-and-bust units-"in
favor of a strategy focusing on arresting upper-level drug dealers and cutting off
the drugs flooding into the city's poorer neighborhoods." Rivera, supra note 62,
at 28. Consequently, under Mayor Dinkins, both the number of drug arrests and
the number of officers in the city's TNTs decreased. David Kocieniewski, City's
War on Crime Off to a Slow Start, NEWSDAY, Sept. 18, 1991, at 26 (stating that
in the past year, drug arrests fell from 48,805 to 36,632, and that the TNT units
dropped from 700 to 500 undercover officers). Between 1989 and 1993,
Narcotics Division staffing levels declined 11% and narcotics arrests declined by
30%. POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 13. The report also notes the
TNT operation's many failings which contributed to its lack of effectiveness,
such as the lack of community involvement, the large size of the targeted areas,
separation from and lack of coordination with police precincts, inadequate use
of uniformed police officers, regular working hours known to street drug dealers
and the lack of a strategy "for holding areas reclaimed by TNT." POLICE
STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 11-14. Under Mayor Dinkins, however,
crime dropped 15%. Giuliani Edges out Dinkins in N.Y. Wins Mayoralty by
Narrow Margin, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 3, 1993, at Al.
Under former Commissioner William J. Bratton, who was appointed by
Mayor Giuliani in 1994 and served until March 1996, the TNTs were replaced
with Strategic Narcotics and Gun ("SNAG") teams, "which change the mission
and some methods of the old TNTs of the Narcotics Division, to initiate
intensive buy-and-bust operations against both drug and gun dealers." POLICE
STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 6; see also Craig Horowitz, The Suddenly
Safer City, N.Y., Aug. 14, 1995, at 22, 23 (describing then Commissioner
Bratton's strategy of attacking crime "solely through effective law enforcement:
using maps, computers, and ... good management," and by addressing "minor
signs of disorder"); Krauss, supra note 62, at Al (reporting that for the first time
since the early 1970s, the police department is giving uniformed police officers
in New York City a large role in finding and arresting drug dealers, so as to
"keep drug locations free of sellers after the specialized units leave the area").
Although it is unclear how police policies will change under the leadership of
Commissioner Howard Safir, appointed in March 1996, it is interesting to note
that he "be[gan] his career in 1965 as an undercover agent in New York with the
Deferal Bureau of Narcotics" and then worked in the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Steven Lee Myers, Fire Commissioner to Take Over as Police
Head, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al, B8.
66 Quality-of-life crimes include "street prostitution, low-level drug dealing,
underage drinking, blaring car radios" and "other crimes that contribute to a
sense of disorder and danger on the street." Bratton, supra note 56, at 447-48.
For a detailed description of police rationale and strategies used to address these
crimes, see generally Bratton, supra note 56; NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T,
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such as low-level drug dealing. Accordingly, from 1993 to 1994,
misdemeanor narcotics arrests in New York City rose by forty-nine
percent.67
Police attribute New York City's recent steep decline in crime
in part to this increased pressure on low-level criminals.68 By
arresting low-level drug dealers in particular, police reduce the
amount of violent crimes because most violent crimes are drug
related.69 In 1994, for example, as narcotics arrests increased,
POLICE STRATEGY No. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK
(1994).
67 Mulugeta, supra note 57, at 1; see also Clifford Krauss, Computers
Entering World of Drug Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at B7 (reporting that
narcotics arrests in New York City increased 27.5% in 1994).
Similarly, on Long Island, after police adopted a policy of "zero tolerance"
toward quality-of-life offenses that they ignored in the past, including low-level
drug dealing, misdemeanor narcotics arrests increased by 44% in Nassau County
and by 38% in Suffolk County from 1993 to 1994. Mulugeta, supra note 57, at
1. Further, narcotics arrests in the Finger Lakes District of the state have nearly
tripled since 1992. Maureen Sieh, Police Team Up to Fight Dealers: Task Force
Aims to Get Drugs off the Street, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., Oct. 15, 1995, at Fl.
These increases "reversed a five-year trend of falling arrest rates throughout the
state." Mulugeta, supra note 57, at 1.
61 Murder Rate Fell in 1994 for 3d Consecutive Year, Agency Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A19 [hereinafter Murder Rate Fell in 1994]. Former
Commissioner Bratton credited the police department for the drop. Charles
Laurence, Crime's Down-But We're Locking Our Doors Anyway, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 10, 1995, at 19. Others disagree, theorizing that the
drop in crime is possibly due to other factors such as gangs voluntarily reducing
the level of violence, smaller numbers of violent people on the street, a
reassertion of values or demographic shifts. Id; see also John Teimey, The Holy
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 82 (noting that although
the hiring of more police officers during the Dinkins Administration may
contribute to the falling crime rate, "New York's decline has been much more
dramatic than other cities'-so sudden and so pronounced that it defies
traditional thinking about crime.. . . Crime rates started plummeting as soon as
the [police] department adopted its new tactics").
69 "[N]early 40 percent of [New York C]ity's violent crime is linked to drug
trafficking in 15 of the 76 precincts," leading police officials to conclude that
"accurate and timely intelligence on drug suspects is the best way to produce
leads toward solving murders, shootings, burglaries and robberies." Krauss, supra
note 67, at B7; see also POLICE STRATEGY NO. 3, supra note 62, at 5 ("Criminal
justice officials ... have noted for many years that the main engine of urban
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crime fell 12.3% in New York City, while nationally the drop in
crime was only 3%.70 Statistics show that felonies in New York
City continue to fall at an unprecedented rate.7' During William
crime in the United States is narcotics. People rob and steal to keep using drugs,
and people kill and maim to keep selling drugs."). The police department
estimates that from 1989-94, "at least 25% of all homicides in New York City
were directly related to drugs." POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 9. At
Manhattan Central Booking during 1993, 78% of all male suspects tested positive
for drugs, 79% of male robbery suspects tested positive for drugs, 81% of male
weapons-charge suspects tested positive for drugs and 80% of male burglary
suspects tested positive for drugs. POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 9.
The great majority tested positive for cocaine. POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra
note 62, at 9. Further, "[f]ederal research has shown that offenders on drugs
engage in criminal activity at a rate four to six times higher than when they are
drug-free." POLICE STRATEGY No. 3, supra note 62, at 9.
70 Horowitz, supra note 65, at 24. New York City is leading a nationwide
drop in crime rates. Laurence, supra note 68, at 19.
71 Horowitz, supra note 65, at 22. Compared to the first half of 1994, during
the first half of 1995 reports of murder in New York City fell by 31%; robbery
fell by 21.9%; felonious assault fell by 6% and car theft fell by 25.2%.
Horowitz, supra note 65, at 22. Compared to 1993, murder fell 37.3%; robbery,
31.3%; felonious assault, 10.6% "and, cumulatively, all reported serious crime
[is] down 27.1 percent." Horowitz, supra note 65, at 22. "[O]ver the two-year
peiod that began in early 1994," murder declined 40% and robbery declined
30%. Clifford Krauss, Drop in Crime Slows to 9% in the Quarter, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1996, at 23. Crime has dropped so sharply that New York is now one of
America's safest cities, and its police department's strategies are being copied
across the nation. Teirney, supra note 68, at 62. "In the past two years overall
crime has dropped nearly 30%, and the rates of robbery and murder have fallen
even more sharply, to the lowest level in 25 years." Teirney, supra note 68, at
82; see also John T. McQuiston, Nassau Is Maligned on Crime Rate, Study Says,
N.Y. TIME, Nov. 21, 1995, at B7 (noting that Professor Harvey Kushner,
chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice at the C. W. Post campus of
Long Island University in Nassau County, reported in a study that "crime in
Nassau is presently at its lowest level in 20 years, and much lower, on a per
capita basis, than either New York City or Suffolk County"); Eric Pooley, One
Good Apple, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54 (profiling Commissioner Bratton and
reporting that crime in New York City is "plunging farther and faster than it has
done anywhere else in the country, faster than any cultural or demographic trend
could explain").
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J. Bratton's tenure as police commissioner, "crime fell to its lowest
levels since the 1960's.,
72
7 David Firestone, Bratton Quits Police Post; New York Gains over Crime
Fed a Rivalry with Giuliani, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at Al. As commis-
sioner, William J. Bratton "presided over the sharpest drop in crime in the city's
history." Krauss, supra note 71, at 21. As outgoing Commissioner Bratton
described in his resignation letter to Mayor Giuliani, "[t]oday, New York is
recording 47[%] fewer homicides than it did when you took office in 1994. In
addition, we have 35[%] fewer burglaries and 40[%] fewer thefts of automobiles.
Overall, New York's serious crime is 32[%] lower than it was when you became
... Mayor." 'Greatest Cops on Earth, 'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at B4. The
most recent police statistics show that "[t]he double-digit decline in crime that
New York City has enjoyed in the last two years is slowing. . . ." Krauss, supra
note 71, at 21. "[R]eports of serious crime declined 9 percent in the first 3
months of [1996]." Krauss, supra note 71, at 21. Unlike in 1994 and 1995, when
"every one of the city's 76 precincts enjoyed substantial decreases in total
reported felony crimes ... 14 precincts in the first quarter of 1996 experienced
small increases in crime over the year-earlier period . . . ." Krauss, supra note
71, at 21. During the first three months of 1996, the murder rate continued to
drop another 15% from last year. Krauss, supra note 71, at 21. "Senior aides to
Mr. Bratton say the newest statistics indicate that felony crime should go down
20 percent more in the next two years-a slowing of the trends of the last two
years but a solid gain nevertheless." Krauss, supra note 71, at 23. These aides
indicated that a new wide-ranging "antinarcotics sweep ... should assure those
gains." Krauss, supra note 71, at 23.
Another result of aggressive policing is that it has made selling drugs much
more difficult, forcing many low-level dealers to alter their methods of doing
business, by driving them indoors or out of state. "Dread," a drug dealer in
Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York, described the difficulties he faced:
Used to be that you could stand on the comer with [crack] in your
pockets or your mouth and make your sales .... Not long ago, you
could make $2,500 a day this way with very little risk. Well, you can
still make some money, but the risk is big.
You can't just stand on the comer no more with your pockets full
of stuff .... You got to stash the shit somewhere on the street. Then
you got to have somebody watching it. Then you need another guy to
get the money. All of this takes time, and it cuts down on the profits.
Anybody who's smart is putting his money away, trying to get enough
to go do something else.
Horowitz, supra note 65, at 22. Persistent police work has transformed former
high volume drug areas, and drug dealing is now less conspicuous. See Purdy,
supra note 4, at Al (reporting that in July 1986, in order to demonstrate how
open the selling of drugs had become, then U.S. Attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani,
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who wore a leather vest and sunglasses, and "Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, who
wore a windbreaker and Army cap, bought crack as part of a buy-and-bust
operation on 160th Street" in Manhattan); Zaret, supra note 1, at 1 A (describing
that as a result of increased police pressure, dealers no longer approach cars).
Where dealers once blatantly approached passers-by on the street, police efforts
have forced their operations into apartment buildings. Purdy, supra note 4, at A 1.
"Steerers," who direct customers inside apartments, and "lookouts" with walkie-
talkies who watch for the police, replaced dealers on the street. Purdy, supra note
4, at Al.
As a result ofconcentratedpolice efforts, targeted neighborhoods, generally,
are safer; however, it is more difficult for the police to arrest dealers indoors
than on the street. Horowitz, supra note 65, at 22. The Los Angeles Police
Department, for example, reduced the city's Chronic Narcotics Sales
Locations--"targets of weekly and sometimes daily buy-bust operations"-from
56 to 32 in four years. Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. Although police know that
drug dealing persists, they arrest less dealers because they have been driven off
the streets. Connelly, supra note 1, at B3. Dealers are now organized in
sophisticated ways to bypass the police. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 4, at Al
(reporting that dealers have "nearly invisible custom-made compartments for
hiding contraband" in apartments and cars, "video cameras trained on the street
to spot police activity" and separate apartments for transactions and for storing
drugs and money); Sieh, supra note 67, at FI (reporting that some drug dealers
"operate out of local hotel rooms or pay residents to use their homes" instead of
conducting business in their own homes). It is therefore harder to arrest them.
Connelly, supra note 1, at B3.
Despite the effect on the commission of serious crime, some criticize the
attention the police department gives to low-level drug dealing. Some critics have
noted the strain the buy-and-bust operation has created on the criminal justice
system and the increased cost to the taxpayers for operating jails and courts for
low-level criminals. Rivera, supra note 62, at 28 (quoting Bob Gangi, executive
director of the Correctional Association of New York, as warning that targeting
street-level dealers leads to higher taxpayer costs for jails and courts for those
who "'are not the mid-level drug dealers or the drug kingpins"'). Due to the
police department's attention to low-level drug dealing and other quality-of-life
offenses, the prison populations in New York have reached record levels.
Laurence, supra note 68, at 19. The "explosion" of arrests for quality-of-life
crimes "is starting to overwhelm the city's criminal justice system." Anthony M.
DeStefano & George E. Jordan, All Jammed Up: Quality-of-Life Busts Clog
Courts, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1994, at 7. In October 1994, about 80% of the
20,000 average daily inmate population in city prisons waited for trial. Id. In
July 1994, the average wait for arraignment was 28.03 hours in the city's
criminal courts, and in September 1994, the average time was 30.64 hours. Id.
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Similarly, in Baltimore, Maryland, during the first quarter of 1995, drug
defendants-62% of all Baltimore felony defendants during this period-waited
an average of nearly seven months before their first trial date unless they agreed
to an early plea bargain. Kate Shatzkin, Prosecutor Acts to Ease Court Backlog,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 7, 1995, at lB. "In an attempt to keep more serious cases from
being delayed" in felony court, the Baltimore state's attorney's office changed
its rules so that prosecutors can charge drug offenders with a misdemeanor if
caught with up to double the amount of drugs that previously qualified as felony
offenses. Id. The change stemmed from the large amounts of drug arrests and an
overflowing Baltimore City Detention Center. Id. Baltimore State's Attorney
Patricia C. Jessamy hoped to be able to "concentrate more resources on large
kingpin and conspiracy cases that could make a real dent in drug distribution
networks." Id. One of the exceptions to the new rule is sales to an undercover
police officer. Id The state's attorney's office also predicted that the police's
"large drug sweeps and other arrests would flood the Baltimore system with
7,482 felony defendants by the end of [1995]-about 1,600 more than in 1994."
Id.
Former Commissioner Bratton maintained that the enforcement of quality-
of-life offenses decreased prison populations because these criminals are
incarcerated for short periods only, and because the enforcement is "chang[ing]
behavior" of criminals. Today Show Interview: Criminologist Jack McDevitt and
New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton on the Sharp Drop in
Crime Across the Country (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 11, 1996).
Others have noted that the buy-and-bust operation has very little long-term
effect on drug trafficking while placing officers in "volatile situations that are
difficult to control." Castaneda, supra note 1, at DI (quoting James Fyfe, a
criminologist at American University and former New York City policeman who
supported the decision to suspend buy-and-bust operations in Washington, D.C.:
"The problem with [buy-and-busts] is they have very little effect on drug traffic
and they put officers at great risk").
[O]perations such as "Buy/Bust" have been criticized for not being
effective in the long term because they go after the small dealer on the
street. Many of the dealers arrested will be out on the street within
days, selling crack again. Besides, its opponents say, when a street-
corner dealer is arrested, another one will just step in to take his place.
Zaret, supra note 1, at IA; see also Rivera, supra note 62, at 28 (quoting Susan
Sadd, an ethnographer with the Vera Institute of Justice, who worked on a 1992
study that reviewed the effectiveness of TNT units in a Brooklyn neighborhood,
arguing that arresting people is a short-term solution that is not sufficient to stop
the drug trade). The police department has attempted to address these and other
criticisms of the TNT operations by implementing new strategies, including
deploying uniformed officers to prevent return of drug activities after undercover
operations, conducting buy-and-bust operations against gun as well as drug
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The buy-and-bust operation places police officers at consider-
able risk, particularly those working undercover.73 The operations
depend, of course, on undercover officers, who pose as drug
addicts, giving them the ability to see what uniformed officers
cannot.74 Drug dealers often arm themselves to deter both robber-
ies and rivals.75 In addition, the dealers are likely to be overly
suspicious or high on drugs themselves. 76 Criminals have over-
whelmingly demonstrated their willingness to use weapons against
police, 77 but undercover police officers in buy-and-bust operations
cannot wear bulletproof vests because they may be searched by the
drug sellers they target. 78 Further, undercover officers may be
forced to follow drug dealers out of the view of their partners, and
thus face potential danger alone.79
Increased reliance on buy-and-bust operations necessitates the
testimony of undercover officers when buy-and-bust operation cases
are tried. The undercover officer is often the primary witness at
dealers and conducting operations seven days a week. POLICE STRATEGY No. 3,
supra note 62, at 10-26.
71 William Hermann, DEA Agent Died in Risky "Buy-Bust": "Terribly
Dangerous" Drug Sting Went Awry, ARiz. REPUBLIC, July 2, 1994, at B1.
71 Zaret, supra note 1, at IA.
75 Zaret, supra note 1, at IA. Dealers may not arm themselves in order to
avoid an additional felony charge if caught, or try to discard their weapons
before an arrest. Zaret, supra note 1, at IA.
76 Hermann, supra note 73, at B1.
7 Castaneda, supra note 1, at DI. The presence of undercover officers in
dangerous areas also places them at risk of random street violence. See Burton
v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL 669908, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
1995) (noting that during a buy-and-bust operation, robbers took an undercover
officer's money and possessions at gun point, then when they discovered his
identity as an undercover officer, they attacked him and shot at him as he fled).
78 Hevesi, supra note 21, at BI.
79 Hermann, supra note 73, at B1. Such dangers led the New York City
Police Department to suspend the use of buy-and-busts in the early 1970s, "after
several officers were shot." Castaneda, supra note 1, at Dl. In 1992, the police
chief of Washington, D.C. also abolished the use of buy-and-bust operations
pending review following a shoot-out. After the undercover officers bought drugs
from three suspects, and the uniformed officers approached to arrest them, "at
least one of the three suspects" fired a gun at the officers. The bullets wounded
one officer in his buttocks and another in the leg. One of the suspects was fatally
shot. Castaneda, supra note 1, at Dl.
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trial.8" Indeed, in certain cases, the officer is the only one who can
identify the defendant as the seller.8 Undercover officers may
have concerns about the potential threat to their safety and to
ongoing investigations should they testify in an open courtroom. 2
In New York, unlike any other jurisdiction, this concern has
prompted prosecutors to regularly request the trial judge to close
the courtroom to the public during undercover officers' testi-
mony.83 Trial courts, generally sensitive to this fear of exposure,
often allow such closure.84
II. THE LAW BEFORE WALLER V. GEORGIA
The right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment 85 and by New York law.86 A public trial has several
80 See supra note 10 (describing relevant citations).
81 E.g., People v. Boyd, 59 A.D.2d 558, 559, 397 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (2d
Dep't 1977) ("The principal and only eye witness against appellant was Police
Officer Veronica Hobbs, who worked as an undercover officer."); People v.
Garcia, 51 A.D.2d 329, 332, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (1st Dep't 1976) ("The
identity of defendant as the seller was established by the testimony of [under-
cover] Officer Ferrer."), affirmed, 41 N.Y.2d 861, 362 N.E.2d 260, 393 N.Y.S.2d
709 (1979).
82 See supra note 11 (listing supporting cases).
83 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing that closing the
courtroom during the testimony of undercover officers is routine in New York
State narcotics cases, primarily in New York City).
84 As New York State Supreme Court Justice Abraham G. Gerges noted:
"The combination of an open courtroom, or even a partially closed courtroom
combined with the capability for instant communication [between criminals]
could prove deadly to some undercover officers. . . ." Gerges, supra note 35, at
2.
85 See supra note 18; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1948).
86 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1992) ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial."); Gannet Co.
v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756,
759 (1977) ("Criminal trials are presumptively open to the public.. . ."), aff'd,
443 U.S. 368 (1979). The federal constitutional right to a public trial stemmed
from colonial reaction to the closed proceedings and harsh bills of attainder
imposed by the British and "[t]he traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret
trials." Leventhal, supra note 35, at 1; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268; see also
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advantages: it "ensur[es] that judge and prosecutor carry out their
duties responsibly ... encourages witnesses to come forward and
discourages perjury."87 The Supreme Court has ruled that criminal
cases are presumptively open to the public.88 However, the Court
has long recognized that the right to a public trial is not abso-
lute,89 and the presumption of an open trial may be overcome
under limited circumstances. 90
People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409,413, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1338, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359,
362 ("[T]he concept of a secret trial is anathema to the social and political
philosophy which motivates our society."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979). A
"bill of attainder" is a legislative act that applies "either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448
(1965).
17 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). Public trials help ensure that
the court, the prosecutor and the police witnesses remain "keenly alive to a sense
of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions... ." Id (quoting
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-72 & n.25; THOMAS M. COOLY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927)); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("The sure knowledge that anyone is free to
attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that
deviations will become known.") (emphasis in original); Jones v. Henderson, 683
F. Supp. 917, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[P]ublic trials safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of criminal proceedings.").
88 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) ("[A]
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our
system of justice.").
89 Id. at 581 n.18 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)).
90 "[T]he right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights
or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's
interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information." Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.
See also United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir.)
("[T]he exclusion of the public in whole or in part has been found constitu-
tionally acceptable where closed proceedings were deemed necessary to preserve
order, to protect the defendant or witnesses, or to maintain the confidentiality of
certain information."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). The court in Vincent
cited the following cases for support: United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669-71
(2d Cir.) (holding closure of suppression hearing justified during testimony
regarding hijacker profile), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States ex
rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding closure where
witness had been intimidated), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970); United States
ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965) (upholding closure to
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Recognizing that the right to a public trial is not absolute,9'
the New York Court of Appeals ruled in People v Hinton that the
testimony of an undercover narcotics officer was an exception to
the general rule of public trials.92 An undercover agent, the
protect witnesses from threats and intimidation), cert. denied sub non, Orlando
v. Follette, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966).
In addition, the New York Civil Rights Law establishes that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial." N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW, art. II, § 12 (McKinney 1992). However, the New York
Legislature has subjected the right to a public trial to certain limitations. The
New York Judiciary Law provides, in pertinent part, that:
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every
citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and
trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent
to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its
discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested
therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.
N.Y. JUD. LAW, art. II § 4 (McKinney 1983).
91 People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 74, 286 N.E.2d 265, 266-67, 334
N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973). The court in
Hinton stated that:
"The public trial concept has, however, never been viewed as imposing
a rigid, inflexible straitjacket on the courts. It has uniformly been held
to be subject to the inherent power of the court to preserve order and
decorum in the courtroom, to protect the rights of parties and
witnesses, and generally to further the administration of justice." That
a trial court has the inherent power to exclude the public from the
courtroom in a criminal case is well settled. The exclusion might be
prompted for any one of a number of reasons. The public has been
excluded when the exhibition of certain evidence was offensive, or a
witness would be unnecessarily embarrassed, or a scandalous trial
would affect young people or a witness would thereby be enabled to
testify to the material facts of a case.
Id. at 74, 286 N.E.2d at 266-67, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (quoting People v. Jelke,
308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772, (1954); and citing, inter alia, Lancaster
v. United States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Geise v. United States, 262
F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); United States v.
Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949)).
92 Id. at 74, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889. For a history of juris-
prudence involving testimony of undercover officers at criminal trials before
Hinton, see Fagan, supra note 35, at 626-27 (describing the New York Court of
Appeals' ruling in People v. Jelke, which "established that New York statutory
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prosecution's primary witness in Hinton, "posed as an addict when
making the narcotic purchases from the defendant." 93 The court
convicted the defendant of "two counts of selling a dangerous drug
in the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a
dangerous drug."94 Before the undercover agent testified, the
district attorney moved to have the courtroom closed to the public
for the following reasons: "(1) the undercover agent was still
operating actively in the community [of the arrest]; (2) that other
narcotic investigations were pending; (3) that other targets in these
narcotic investigations were present in the courtroom, thus
jeopardizing the agent's life if his identity were exposed."9' Based
on these arguments, the court excluded the public during the
agent's testimony.9
6
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the closure and ruled
that under the circumstances, the defendant's right to a public trial
was not violated by exclusion of the public. 97 In creating this
exception to the general rule of open courtrooms, the court stressed
that closure was only warranted under limited circumstances:
and common law grants trial courts authority to close courtrooms for the
protection of witnesses").
" Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d at 73, 286 N.E.2d at 266, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 73, 75, 286 N.E.2d at 266, 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 887, 889. The
court followed two cases. The court relied on People v. Hagan, stating that in
Hagan:
We held that: "In the balancing of policy and of interest if, for a good
reason related directly to the management of the trial, the Judge closes
the courtroom as to the testimony of a witness and otherwise keeps it
open to the press and public, a defendant is not necessarily deprived of
a 'public' trial."
Id. at 75, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889 (citing People v. Hagan, 24
N.Y.2d 395, 397-98, 248 N.E.2d 588, 590, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837, cert. denied,
396 U.S. 886 (1969)). Further, the court ruled that "[t]he rationale offered in
Pacuicca for the exclusion was to shield the identity of the [undercover police]
witness from the public and to preserve not only her future usefulness, but also
her life." Id. (citing People v. Pacuicca, 134 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1954)
(upholding conviction of defendant, who purchased narcotics from an undercover
officer), aff'd, 144 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1955)).
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"While we reaffirm today the inherent discretionary power of the
trial court to close the courtroom, we need only point out that the
discretion be sparingly exercised and then, only when unusual
circumstances necessitate it.
''g8
9' Id. at 75-76, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889. It is unclear which
facts the court found to establish "unusual circumstances." The court stressed the
presence of the undercover officer's other investigatory targets in the courtroom.
Id. at 75, 286 N.E.2d at 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 889. However, the court called
this merely an "added factor" to the fact that the police witness had an identity
"unknown to the public" and "was engaged in other narcotics investigations." Id.
Thus, it is unclear whether the court found dispositive the presence of other
targets in the courtroom. If so, after Hinton, courts could close the courtroom
only if such targets were present. If, in contrast, these spectators were not
essential to the court's ruling, Hinton merely requires that a police witness be
actively working undercover to properly close the courtroom to spectators during
the officer's testimony.
The ambiguity in Hinton led to contradictory results in the lower courts. In
People v. Richards, the Appellate Division, First Department, found reversible
error when the trial court excluded the public during the testimony of an
undercover officer merely "because he was still engaged in similar activities in
the same 'general area"' and reversed defendant's conviction of "criminal sale
of a dangerous drug in the third degree." 48 A.D.2d 792, 792-93, 369 N.Y.S.2d
162, 163-64 (Ist Dep't 1975) (ruling that "[a]ctive engagement in the community
as an undercover narcotics agent is itself a compelling reason for excluding the
public from the courtroom"), overruled by People v. Santos, 154 A.D.2d 284,
546 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1st Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 817, 551 N.E.2d
1245, 552 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1990). The Richards court based the decision on
Hinton's requirement of "unusual circumstances." Id. at 792-93, 369 N.Y.S.2d
at 163-64 ("We find no 'unusual circumstances' presented in the instant case
sufficient to sanction the violation of defendant's general right to a public
trial."); see also People v. Boyd, 59 A.D.2d 558, 559-60, 397 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152
(2d Dep't 1977) ("It is reversible error to close the courtroom summarily if there
are no unusual circumstances, the undercover agent was shown to be only in the
same general area and there was no hearing and no finding, but only a brief
conclusory recital for relief.").
Another trial court denied a motion for closure on similar grounds, noting
that the unusual circumstances that warranted closure in Hinton included the
"actual, and not the anticipated or possible presence of persons in the courtroom
whose recognition of the officer as such would place either him or his
investigations in jeopardy." Suppression Motion, supra note 35, at 21.
In marked contrast to Richards, the First Department in People v. Garcia
affirmed the trial court's decision to close the courtroom where the undercover
officer, "prior to and at the time of his testimony, was engaged in undercover
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, like the New York Court
of Appeals, allowed an exception to the defendant's right to a
public trial during the testimony of undercover officers. In United
States ex rel. Lloyd v Vincent,9 the Second Circuit specifically
found that in Hinton, the presence in the courtroom of other targets
of the narcotics investigation "was not essential to the [New York
Court of Appeals'] decision."' ° Therefore, a trial court could
close the courtroom simply because the witness is an undercover
narcotics investigations." 51 A.D.2d 329, 330, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (lst Dep't
1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 861, 362 N.E.2d 260, 393 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1979).
In Garcia, the First Department based its ruling on the public interest in
ending drug trafficking, and emphasized that a narcotics officer is "embarked
upon a dangerous venture." Garcia, 51 A.D.2d at 331, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 273
("Disclosure of such person's identity will not only destroy his usefulness, but
could jeopardize his life."). Unlike Hinton, where potential targets of the
undercover officer's investigations viewed the trial, there were no other special
or unusual circumstances about the testifying officer or the conditions of the
case. The only relevant fact noted by the court was that the officer actively
worked undercover before the trial and during his testimony. Id. In a dissent
from the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the ruling in Garcia, Judge Jacob D.
Fuchsberg noted that the holding adopted a per se rule for closing the courtroom
during the testimony of an undercover agent. People v. Garcia, 41 N.Y.2d 861,
862, 362 N.E.2d 260, 261, 393 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710 (1977) (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
The New York Appellate Division courts also did not agree as to whether
Hinton required a hearing to determine whether unusual circumstances existed.
Some courts, including Richards, specifically held under Hinton that courtroom
closure during an undercover agent's testimony without a preclosure hearing was
reversible error. People v. Richards, 48 A.D.2d 792, 793, 369 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164
(1975). See Fagan, supra note 35, at 629 (citing People v. Doty, 73 A.D.2d 802,
423 N.Y.S.2d 797 (4th Dep't 1979); People v. Boyd, 59 A.D.2d 558, 559-60,
397 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (2d Dep't 1977); People v. Morales, 53 A.D.2d 517, 518,
383 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (1st Dep't 1976)). In other cases, however, courts upheld
closure where there was no factual hearing on whether unusual circumstances
existed. Garcia, 51 A.D.2d at 330, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 273; People v. Rickenbacker,
50 A.D.2d 566, 566, 374 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (2d Dep't 1975).
'9 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
00 Id. at 1275 n.1. Vincent was an appeal of a district court decision
granting petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. A jury convicted Lloyd of two counts
of "selling a dangerous drug in the third degree . . . ." Id. at 1273.
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agent.'' The Second Circuit did not find this relaxed standard to
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial;
rather, the Second Circuit agreed with the Hinton court that the
right to a public trial is not absolute, and recognized the trial
judge's discretion to close the courtroom during the testimony of
an undercover police officer.10 2 It noted that this discretion should
be "sparingly exercised and limited to those situations where such
action is deemed necessary to further the administration of
justice."103 The Second Circuit concluded that "shielding the
identity of a police witness, preserving his future usefulness, and
safeguarding his life provides an adequate justification for exclud-
ing the public" during the officer's testimony.10 4
Thus, the rulings in incent and Hinton were not specifically
rooted in any particular circumstance or risk posed by the case that
caused a danger to the witnesses. Instead, the courts acknowledged
the dangers of undercover work in general. Under this analysis, a
trial court could close the courtroom for the testimony of any active
'0' Id. at 1274-75 ("[Wie conclude, as have the New York courts, that
shielding the identity of a police witness, preserving his future usefulness, and
safeguarding his life provides an adequate justification for excluding the public
for that limited period while an undercover agent is testifying.").
102 See supra note 90 (quoting from the court's opinion and citing other
cases in which courts allowed the presumption of an open trial to be overcome).
103 Vincent, 520 F.2d at 1274.
104 Id; see also U.S. ex rel. Maisonet v. La Valee, 405 F. Supp. 925, 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ruling that the trial court's decision to close the courtroom
during testimony of an undercover officer in a drug case, "whose safety might
have been endangered if his identity had been publicly exposed was a reasonable
resolution of the conflicting interests").
In Vincent, the court acknowledged that rather than relying exclusively on
the prosecution's statements about the witnesses' need for closure, "the better
course would have been for the trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing"
showing that the witnesses' "confidentiality would be jeopardized or that their
lives would in fact be endangered." Vincent, 520 F.2d at 1275. However, it ruled
that it was within the trial court's power to find that exclusion was warranted "on
the basis of [its] judicial knowledge of the role of undercover agents," such as
"the facts that undercover agents lived a perilous life ... and that their mere
appearance in court as witnesses ... created a risk of exposure of their identities
to actual or potential targets of their active investigations." Id.
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undercover officer, regardless of whether there is an actual threat
to that particular witness in the circumstances at hand.
Since Hinton and Vincent, the New York state courts and the
Second Circuit have wrestled with the showing prosecutors must
make to close the courtroom during an undercover officer's
testimony and the manner in which prosecutors must make such a
showing. In People v Jones,'°5 the New York Court of Appeals
imposed stricter factual requirements for closure than those in
Hinton.
In Jones, the court noted that the trial judge determined that
there was "a real and present danger" to the undercover officer's
safety based upon the prosecutor's representation. 6 In so doing,
the court noted that the trial judge did not hold a hearing or receive
"an iota of supporting information,"' 7 but merely noted that "the
very nature of the work of the undercover agent in the City of New
York involved with narcotics is such as to place him in jeopardy
every day he is on the streets."'0 8 However, during testimony, the
witness revealed that he was no longer working undercover or on
open investigations, or even near his former area. 9 The New
York Court of Appeals found that closure under these circum-
stances violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial."
'o' 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 946 (1979).
106 Id. at 413, 391 N.E.2d at 1338, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
107 Id. at 412, 391 N.E.2d at 1338, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 413, 391 N.E.2d at 1338, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
'10 Id. at 414-15, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363; see also People
v. Castro, 63 A.D.2d 891, 891-92, 405 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (1st Dep't 1978). In
Castro, the court reversed the defendant's conviction where the trial court closed
the courtroom without a hearing, based solely on the prosecutor's representation
that the officer was still engaged in the purchase of narcotics. Only when the
officer testified did he reveal that he had been transferred from the Bronx
Narcotics Division to the Joint Federal Task Force and was no longer working
undercover in the Bronx. Id. In People v. Boyd, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction where the trial court sealed the courtroom upon the
representation of the prosecutor that the undercover officer was still active. 59
A.D.2d 558, 559, 397 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (2d Dep't 1977). At trial, however, the
officer testified that she no longer worked for the New York City Police
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In sharp contrast to the earlier cases, the Jones court ruled that
"[t]here should have been a factual showing that an exception to
the norm of a public trial was justified, ' ' ' and criticized the trial
court for relying on "its own unparticularized impressions of the
vicissitudes of undercover work in general.""1 2 The court ruled
that "no closing can be tolerated that is not preceded by an inquiry
careful enough to assure the court that the defendant's right to a
public trial is not being sacrificed for less than compelling
reasons.""' 3 The court suggested in certain cases the trial court
may need to hold a hearing to determine whether such "compelling
reasons" exist,"4 now known as a "Hinton hearing." '15
After Jones, trial courts permitted a showing that the witness
was an active undercover officer to overcome the presumption of
an open courtroom. In People v Cantone,"6 for example, the
court upheld closure where the undercover officer testified during
a hearing that he continued to work undercover and was assigned
to the same area as the arrest, even where the area of operation was
as large as a county."7 Similar information, given solely by a
prosecutor, without a hearing or testimony from the officer, did not
Department, and was presently working undercover in New Jersey. Id, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 151.
.. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d at 415, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
..2 Id. ("That undercover work at times entails serious threats to the safety
of agents was by no means sufficient to connect that threat to this witness.").
13 Id. at 414-15, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
114 Id. at 414, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
" E.g., Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
116 73 A.D.2d 936, 423 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 1980), habeas corpus
granted, Cantone v. Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, 589 F.
Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 759 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
Cantone v. Scully, 474 U.S. 835 (1985).
117 Id. at 937, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 508. The officer testified at the hearing in
Cantone that:
[H]e was currently engaged in two undercover drug investigations in
Nassau County and that there were five "contracts" on his life, two of
which were placed by persons on Long Island, and one of which called
for his death before he testified in the instant case. The officer further
stated that he was the only black agent assigned to the Long Island
District Office of the Drug Enforcement Agency.
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usually pass muster after Jones."' New York appellate courts did
not seem to consider that the simple requirement of active
undercover work supported closure in the vast majority of buy-and-
bust cases, even where a particular case posed no specific threat to
a witness's safety.
III. WALLER v. GEORGIA AND THE TRIAL TESTIMONY OF
UNDERCOVER OFFICERS
In Waller v Georgia,"9 the Supreme Court applied a four-
prong test to determine whether closure of a suppression hearing
violated the defendant's right to a public trial. ° The New York
Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit district courts adopted this
test to evaluate closure during the trial testimony of undercover
officers.' Second Circuit district courts consistently apply the
118 See People v. Cuevas, 50 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024, 409 N.E.2d 1360, 1361,
431 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1980) (ruling that the trial court, which granted motion
to close the courtroom after questioning the prosecutor, "erred by failing to make
an adequate inquiry of the witness, as well as the factual finding prescribed by
People v. Jones"); People v. Romain, 137 A.D.2d 848, 848, 525 N.Y.S.2d 313,
313 (2d Dep't 1988) (finding reversible error where courtroom closed for
testimony of undercover officer without prior hearing); People v. Cousart, 74
A.D.2d 877, 878, 426 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (2d Dep't 1980) (finding error where
trial court acted solely upon prosecutor's statement that closure was necessary for
"'the safety and protection of this police officer, working in an undercover
capacity. He is still active in various parts of the City"'). But ef People v.
Pollack, 50 N.Y.2d 547, 551, 407 N.E.2d 472, 474, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630
(1980) (finding no error where "defense counsel made no request for a hearing
nor did she dispute the People's contention that the witness would be in danger
if the general public was not excluded"); People v. Portilla, 190 A.D.2d 827,
828, 593 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (2d Dep't) (ruling that trial court did not err in
failing to order, sua sponte, a full hearing where defense did not object on this
ground), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 852, 627 N.E.2d 526, 606 N.Y.S.2d 604
(1993).
119 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
120 Id. at 48.
121 See infra note 141 (listing cases from the New York Court of Appeals
and the Second Circuit).
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test in reviewing these closure orders by trial courts; 22 New York
State lower courts do not,'23 resulting in problematic law.
In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of closing a
suppression hearing to the public to avoid tainting evidence in
Waller v Georgia. 2 4 In Waller, the Court noted that the trial
court granted the prosecution's motion to close a suppression
hearing'25 to the public so that information derived from wiretaps
would not be "published in open court" and therefore tainted for
use in future trials.'26 The Supreme Court ruled that the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to a
suppression hearing, and that the trial court failed to give that right
proper weight.1 27 The Court applied a stringent four-part test to
determine whether closure of the suppression hearing was appropri-
ate: 28 (1) "the party seeking to close the hearing must advance
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced;"' 129 (2) "the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that inter-
est;"'130 (3) "the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives
to closing the proceeding"'' 3 ' and (4) the trial court "must make
findings adequate to support the closure.' 32 Unless the party
122 See infra note 143 (listing relevant cases).
123 See supra note 35 (citing cases and other authority).
124 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
'25 See supra note 28 (describing a suppression hearing).
126 Waller, 467 U.S. at 42. The trial court agreed with the prosecution's
argument that because "the evidence derived in the wiretaps would 'involve"'
other suspects, the courtroom should be closed to comply with Georgia's wiretap
statute, whereby "'[a]ny publication' of information obtained under a wiretap
warrant that was not 'necessary and essential' would cause the information to be
inadmissible as evidence." Id. at 41-42 (referring to GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
64(b)(8) (1982)).
127 Waller, 467 U.S. at 43, 47.
128 Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Ca., 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984)).
129 Id. at 48.
130 Id.
131 Id.
112 Id. The Court ruled that the state's "proffer was not specific as to whose
privacy interests might be infringed, how they would be infringed, what portions
of the tapes might infringe them, and what portion of the evidence existed of the
tapes;" therefore, "the trial court's findings were broad and general, and did not
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seeking closure satisfied all four prongs of the test, closure would
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.' 33
Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant need not prove
specific prejudice in order to gain relief, since the defendant is
likely to have great difficulty in demonstrating proof of prejudice
caused by the closure.134
The Court reconciled a defendant's right to a public trial with
other countervailing "rights or interests"'35 by requiring a careful
fact-based inquiry into the specifics of the danger posed by an open
courtroom in a particular case. First, the Court placed the burden
on the prosecution to prove that it has an interest so overriding that
it necessitates closure. 3 6 Second, by requiring that the trial court
consider alternatives to closure and narrowly tailor the scope of
closure, the Court ensured that the trial court would carefully
inspect the factual basis of the request for closure.'37 Last, the
required findings must be "specific enough that a reviewing court
can determine whether the closure order was properly entered," 3 '
again ensuring a fair amount of factual detail, as "broad and
general" findings cannot justify closure. ' 9 The Court anticipated
that circumstances meriting closure "will be rare," and that this
"balance of interests must be struck with special care.' ' 40
While the issue in Waller was closure of a suppression hearing,
subsequent decisions by the New York Court of Appeals and the
Second Circuit applied the Waller test to closures during the trial
testimony of an undercover witness.' 4' The Supreme Court
purport to justify closure of the entire hearing." Id.
' Id. at 45-47.
'14 Id. at 49-50 n.9.
"' The Court cited the examples of "the defendant's right to a fair trial or
the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information." Id
at 45.
136 Id. at 48.
131 Id. at 48-49.
131 Id. at 45 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Ca., 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984)).
139 Id. at 48.
140 Id. at 45.
'41 Pearson v. James, No. 94-CV-1499, 1995 WL 617331, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 20, 1995); Ayala v. Speckard, No. 94-CV-7850, 1995 WL 373419, at *2.4
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implicitly overruled the relatively lax "compelling reasons" test of
Jones with the Waller test, and guarded against basing closure on
imprecise "judicial knowledge" of the dangers in undercover work,
as in United States ex rel. Lloyd v incent.'42
New York's lower courts, however, have failed to consistently
apply the Waller four-prong test. Although the district courts in the
Second Circuit adopted Waller's scrupulous test in reviewing
closure orders for undercover officers' testimony,143 not all New
York State courts followed Waller's strict standards for closure.
Despite the New York Court of Appeals' express adoption of the
Waller four-part test in People v Kan, 44 many New York State
lower courts failed to conform to Waller's requirements. These
courts upheld courtroom closure in the vast majority of cases where
the undercover officer merely testified that he or she was still
working on pending investigations, 141 particularly where those
investigations were in the same general area as the arrest or the
trial. 146 As one commentator noted, appellate courts were
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995); Daniel v. Kelly, No. CV-78-830E, 1990 WL 130523,
at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1990); People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 442-44,
624 N.E.2d 1027, 1030, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936-37 (1993).
142 520 F.2d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
143 Burton v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL 669908, at *3-4
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995); Pearson, 1995 WL 617331, at *1-2; Ayala, 1995 WL
373419, at *2-4; Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571, 574, 577-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Daniel, 1990 WL 130523, at *6-7; Ip v. Henderson, 710 F. Supp. 915,
917 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 888 F.2d 1376 (2d Cir. 1989); Martinez
v. Sullivan, 88-CV-7335, 1989 WL 63103, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1989),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1990); Jones v. Henderson, 683 F. Supp. 917, 923-
24 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
144 78 N.Y.2d 54, 57-59, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1043, 571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438-39
(1991) ("The United States Supreme Court has articulated a four-prong test by
which to assess the propriety of closure," reciting the test).
"'5 See supra note 35 (citing cases and other authority).
146 People v. Jackson, 171 A.D.2d 756, 756, 567 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (2d
Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 967, 580 N.E.2d 419, 574 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1991); People v. White, 170 A.D.2d 629, 629, 566 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (2d
Dep't), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 1002, 575 N.E.2d 414, 571 N.Y.S.2d 928
(1991); People v. Carter, 162 A.D.2d 218, 219, 556 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (1st
Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 984, 565 N.E.2d 521, 563 N.Y.S.2d 772
(1990); People v. Bowden, 156 A.D.2d 372, 372, 548 N.Y.S.2d 328, 328 (2d
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"reluctant to find any error so long as closure was not based solely
on the prosecutor's conclusory assertions that it was necessary to
protect the identity of the undercover officer.', 147 These courts
adopted essentially a per se closure rule for active undercover
officers, even though the Supreme Court proscribed such blanket
closures. 1
48
In People v Martinez,149 the New York Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the Waller standard and clarified the factual showing
required for closure. 5 ° The court concluded that to allow closure
where there is merely a perfunctory showing of danger to the
witness "would in effect sanction a rule of per se closure of
undercover officers.'' 1.. In Martinez, the court found the
Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 731, 557 N.E.2d 1189, 558 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1990); People v. McLennon, 156 A.D.2d 478, 478, 548 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (2d
Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 921, 554 N.E.2d 77, 555 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1990); People v. Santos, 154 A.D.2d 284, 284, 546 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1st
Dep't 1989), appealdenied, 75 N.Y.2d 817, 551 N.E.2d 1245, 552 N.Y.S.2d 567
(1990); People v. Tinsley, 145 A.D.2d 448, 448, 535 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416, 417 (2d
Dep't 1988).
147 Leventhal, supra note 35, at 1.
Although the courts formally reject a per se exception for an under-
cover witness, a showing of almost any factor will justify closure. In
the context of the violent war against narcotics related crime, it is not
difficult for prosecutors to set forth such a factor and for a trial judge
to sustain it. It will, on the other hand, be most difficult if not
impossible for a defense attorney to overcome the "narcotics excep-
tion" to a public trial.
Leventhal, supra note 35, at 1.
1 The Supreme Court ruled that a Massachusetts statute requiring
mandatory closure in trials involving sexual abuse of a minor during the
testimony of the victim was unconstitutional because it "requir[ed] no particular-
ized determinations in individual cases." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 611 n.27 (1982). The state's interest in protecting the victims and
encouraging their testimony did "not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is
clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of
the interest." Id. at 607-08.
149 82 N.Y.2d 436, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1993).
150 Id.
"' Id. at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
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prosecution's factual showing was too weak'52 where the officer's
area of undercover operation was the entire Bronx,'53 and the
officer made no reference "to associates of defendant or targets of
investigation likely to be present in the courtroom, or to threats
received" by the witness in connection with the case.'54
The New York Court of Appeals then contrasted the unparticu-
larized facts of Martinez with those in the companion case, People
v Pearson, where the undercover officer was part of ongoing
investigations in the specific area of the arrest and "would be
returning to work in that area immediately after testifying."' 55
Under such circumstances, the court concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in "concluding that, in these circum-
stances, testifying in an open courtroom might endanger the
undercover officer's safety."' 56 Reviewing the decision on the
subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court
agreed that the factual showing in Pearson satisfied the Waller
test. 157
152 The officer answered affirmatively to the prosecution's questions as to
whether he was actively working undercover in the Bronx on a number of open
cases, and whether he "fear[ed] for [his] safety if the courtroom is not closed in
this case." Id. at 439, 624 N.E.2d at 1028-29, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 933-34. On cross-
examination, the officer revealed that suspects had already been arrested in all
his open cases, and that his "area of operations was 'the whole Bronx."' Id at
439-40, 624 N.E.2d at 1029, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
13 The court noted that the Bronx included "more than 41 square miles and
1.2 million residents." Id.
114 Id. at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 936. The court was
critical of the fact that "no link was made, or even attempted, between the
officer's fear for his safety throughout the Bronx area and open-court testimony
in this buy-and-bust case." Id.
1' Id. at 440, 624 N.E.2d at 1029, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
16 Id. at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 936. The court also
ruled that the trial court did not err in failing to consider reasonable alternatives
to closure or whether closure was broader than necessary because the defendant
did not object or argue on these grounds at trial. Id. at 444, 624 N.E.2d at 1031-
32, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
"' Pearson v. James, 94-CV- 1499, 1995 WL 617331, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
20, 1995). The court ruled that the officer's fear for his safety was an overriding
interest "because the trial court found that the officer was still working
undercover, was planning to work in the area where the 'buy and bust' involving
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Even with Martinez's recent reemphasis of the detailed test of
Waller and its specific factual requirements, results in the lower
New York courts continue to be inconsistent. In some cases, New
York courts have cited the Waller test, following the lead of the
New York Court of Appeals.' In People v Tapia,'59 for exam-
ple, the First Department held under Waller, Kan and Martinez that
closure was improper where the undercover officer was actively
engaged in ongoing investigations throughout the entire Bronx. 160
Most New York trial courts within the First and Second Depart-
ments, however, still ignore the Waller test, although to a lesser
degree than before Martinez.
Many lower courts have recently applied the less stringent
"compelling reasons" standard of People v Jones,'6' which
allows trial court judges much more discretion than Waller and
does not require that the prosecution advance a particularized
factual basis for closing or that the trial judge make reviewable
findings supporting closure on the record. 6 ' For example, in
petitioner occurred, and feared for her safety. . . ." Id. at *2. The court further
ruled that the second and third prongs of Waller were satisfied because the
courtroom was closed only during the undercover officer's testimony, and
because the petitioner did not suggest alternatives to closure at trial. The court
found sufficient the trial court's finding that "the officer was continuing to
operate undercover in the same area. . . ." Id.
' E.g., People v. Green, 627 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't 1995) (finding that
closure was broader than necessary where defendant's request to have his family
present was not granted); People v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d 742, 742-43, 616
N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1 st Dep't) (ruling that an overriding interest was "sufficiently
articulated" where the undercover officer "anticipated" involvement in operations
in the area of defendant's arrest, that closure was "sufficiently restricted," and
that defendant did not request alternative means of protecting the interest at trial),
appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d 126, 622 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994).
"9 207 A.D.2d 286,286,615 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1st Dep't), appealdenied,
84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d 1228, 621 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1994).
160 Id.
16' 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 946 (1979).
162 Id. at 414-15, 391 N.E.2d at 1339, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
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People v Brown,163 the Second Department upheld closure of the
courtroom where the undercover agent was "actively involved
in [a] certain large-scale investigation" in an undetermined
geographical area."6 Other courts continue to allow closure b ised
on assumptions about the level of danger to the witness. For
example, in People v Gross,165 the court upheld closure of the
courtroom where defense counsel "made no effort" to ascertain
whether the officer was still working undercover. 66 Courts that
have declined to apply any or all four prongs of the Waller test,
however, have required a much stronger factual basis for closure
than before Martinez.167 Following Martinez, courts have gener-
ally allowed closure only where the undercover officer continued
to operate in the specific area of the defendant's arrest, although
the courts do not always note the scope of this area. 61
163 214 A.D.2d 579, 579-80, 625 N.Y.S.2d 570, 572 (2d Dep't), appeal
denied, 86 N.Y.2d 732, 655 N.E.2d 710, 631 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1995).
164 Brown, 214 A.D.2d at 579, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72. At the Hinton
hearings, the officer testified that "he was actively involved in certain large-scale
investigations in connection with which his safety had been threatened, that there
was a very real danger that if his identity became public, those threats might be
realized, and that his ongoing investigations might be compromised." Id. (citation
omitted).
165 179 A.D.2d 138, 583 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 80
N.Y.2d 832, 600 N.E.2d 643, 587 N.Y.2d 916 (1992).
166 Id. at 140-41, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
167 See supra note 41 (citing relevant cases).
168 People v. Acevedo, 626 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (1st Dep't) (ruling closure
proper where the undercover officer "identified a very specific street location, the
site of defendant's arrest," where he had ongoing operations and where he was
immediately returning), appeal denied, 85 N.Y.2d 969, 653 N.E.2d 969, 629
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1995); People v. Clifford, 626 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1st Dep't 1995)
(ruling closure proper where the undercover officer testified that "he actively
participated in other ongoing undercover operations in the same neighborhood of
defendant's arrest"); People v. Forman, 626 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (2d Dep't 1995)
(ruling closure proper where "[t]he undercover officer testified that he had open
cases in the area of the defendant's arrest and would be returning to the area");
People v. James, 207 A.D.2d 564, 564, 616 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (2d Dep't 1995)
(ruling closure was abuse of trial court's discretion where "[t]he record neither
reflects that the undercover officers were still operating in the locale of the
defendant's arrest nor that they expected to return there"); cf People v. Brown,
172 A.D.2d 844, 845, 846, 569 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209, 210 (2d Dep't 1991)
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It is without question that Waller binds the New York courts.
As the Southern District of New York recently noted in response
to one petitioner's argument that an entire line of New York cases
was: "suspect" for ignoring Waller's requirements: "While this
[c]ourt need not address this issue, it is beyond cavil that New
York state courts, indeed the courts of all states, must comport with
the minimal requirements demanded by the Constitution as
explicitly enunciated in Waller.'' 169 The failure of New York
State courts to comply with Waller results in unreliable and unclear
law. Further, the inconsistencies in courtroom closure cases lead to
complications in habeas corpus petitions, requiring federal courts
to struggle to determine the applicable law, and whether there is
exhaustion or procedural default. 70
(upholding closure where, inter alia, undercover officer "anticipated" transfer to
vicinity of defendant's arrest).
169 Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571, 579 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In one
case the First Department acknowledged the tendency of trial courts to ignore the
Waller test:
Initially, we note that while the trial court complied with People v.
Jones ... insofar as a hearing was conducted during which it was
determined that the undercover feared for his life, the court did not
specifically address the criteria set forth in Waller v. Georgia ...
which was decided subsequent to Jones, and which clarifies and lends
structure to a criminal defendant's otherwise amorphous right to an
open trial, mandating steps that a trial judge must first take before
granting the government's request for exclusion and therefore
providing greater protection for the individual defendant.
People v. Vidal, 172 A.D.2d 228, 229, 567 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (1st Dep't 1991)
(citation omitted), habeas corpus granted, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
State v. Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325, 328 (Wash. 1995) (ruling that the
"Washington Constitution provides at minimum the same protection of a
defendant's fair trial rights as the Sixth Amendment," as interpreted by Waller).
171 In Okonkwo, for example, the state argued that the petitioner's claim was
procedurally barred because petitioner did not object with respect to each prong
of the Waller test. 895 F. Supp. at 574 n.3. The district court noted that the
appellate division "affirmed a bare trial court ruling-one apparently neglecting
to consider the controlling precedent of Waller." Id. at 576 n.9. It ruled that the
appellate division directly addressed the merits of the findings prong of Waller
only, and "in the absence of a specific [a]ppellate [d]ivision ruling on each
Waller prong, no bar exists with respect to the prongs on which it was silent"
because the petitioner objected to the application of the Waller test "as a whole."
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IV AN ANALYSIS OF THE WALLER TEST'S FOUR PRONGS
The Waller test provides protection for a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right by carefully balancing the witness's and the
defendant's interests through a thorough examination of the factual
basis for closure. The Waller test is well-suited to govern closure
during undercover officers' testimony as long as New York courts
apply and satisfy its prongs.17 This section will analyze each of
the four prongs of the Waller test, discuss the remedies for
violation of the test and make a recommendation to ensure
application of the test by the New York State courts.
Id. The district court "decline[d] to rule that the [a]ppellate [d]ivision erred in
implicitly ruling that each prong ... constitutes an individual claim requiring
preservation by specific objection under the New York statute." Id. at 582; cf
People v. Forman, 626 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (2d Dep't 1995) (affirming closure on
the merits but ruling that defendant's contention that closure was broader than
necessary was unpreserved for appellate review).
171 One commentator urges the Supreme Court to establish a separate rule
that specifically addresses closure during the trial testimony of undercover
officers. Fagan, supra note 35, at 636. Professor Fagan states that "undercover
status should per se warrant closure unless the defendant establishes that public
testimony is necessary" or shows that "the agent is no longer working under-
cover." Fagan, supra note 35, at 636, 639. This blanket rule, however, would
result in courtroom closure in a great number of criminal cases. Given the
resurgence of buy-and-bust operations in New York, many drug cases involve a
purchase by an active undercover officer. Krauss, supra note 62, at Al. More
importantly, the danger exists that the public may be excluded from courtrooms
even when no factual basis for the officer's fears regarding testifying in a
particular case exists. "If the undercover agent was the principal witness to the
alleged offense, and it is expected that the agent's testimony will constitute the
bulk of the state's proof, it may be argued that excluding the public during the
witness's testimony will amount virtually to a secret trial." Thomas M. Fleming,
Annotation, Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve
Confidentiality of Undercover Witness, 54 A.L.R. 1156 (4th ed. 1994). The
defendant's right to a public trial merits stronger protection than this blanket rule
acknowledges.
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A. The First Prong: An Overriding Interest Meriting
Closure
The first prong of the Waller test requires that the prosecution
demonstrate an "overriding interest that is likely to be preju-
diced" 72 in order to close the courtroom to the public. 73 New
York courts agree that in certain circumstances, testimony from an
undercover officer "'whose public appearance would endanger their
lives or seriously damage other investigations' is an "overriding
interest" meriting closure. 174 To satisfy this prong, the state must
show the factual basis of the closure request, including evidence
that supports the undercover officer's belief that his or her life and
work are jeopardized by an open trial. 75 The trial judge may then
weigh the level of danger posed to the witness by testifying in an
open courtroom. 176 Specific evidence of the actual danger posed
prevents the courts from closing their courtrooms unnecessarily, by
reliance on such vague concerns as the undercover officer's general
172 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
17' However, where there is only a partial closure, with only certain people
excluded, "a 'substantial reason' rather than Waller's 'overriding interest' will
justify the closure." Woods v. Kuhlman, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992)
(following Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
957 (1989); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, Charley v. U.S., 506 U.S. 958 (1992); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d
531 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985)). But cf United States
v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding closing to be "partial" during
testimony of certain prosecution's witnesses, closing statements, and defendant
and jury charge).
17' Report & Recommendation at 10, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-3253
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) (citing Ayala v. Speckard, No. 94-CV-7850, 1995 WL
373419, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995) ("Safety of undercover officer can rise
to level of an 'overriding interest."'); Policano v. Riley, No. 90-CV-1312, 1990
WL 179740, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1990) ("'Protection of the identity and
safety of an undercover officer engaged in ongoing investigations is sufficient to
justify closure of trial."')).
17' Burton v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL 669908, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995); Ayala, 1995 WL 373419, at *3; Jones v. Henderson,
683 F. Supp 917, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
176 Ayala, 1995 WL 373419, at *3.
700
CLOSING THE COURTROOM 701
fear of discovery, the prosecution's outdated information as to the
officer's undercover activities or the judge's personal conception of
the dangers of undercover work in general. 177
As U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the Southern
District of New York recently noted, "[d]espite the recognized
general dangers faced by undercover officers, the courts [under
177 The choice between the competing interests of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights and the undercover officer's need for safety can be a difficult
one for trial judges. In making this decision, judges may not be able to ignore
what they believe about the dangers of undercover work in general. As New
York State Supreme Court Justice Gerges observed:
The proverbial "damned if you do and damned if you don't" can best
express a judge's dilemma in closing a courtroom during testimony of
an undercover police officer. . . . It is that very balance of competing
interests that is proving problematic. . . . The options before the court
are closure of the courtroom, thus impinging on defendant's consti-
tutional rights or an open courtroom, potentially jeopardizing the life
of a police officer or confidential informant already engaged in an
unquestionably hazardousjob. Both alternatives are equally unaccepta-
ble.
The overwhelming tide of illicit drugs pervading our society has
necessitated a change in the volume and type of police undercover
investigations. Undercover 'buy and bust' operations or testimony from
a confidential informant are often the only way for the police to glean
evidence against suspected drug dealers. There is no question that
undercover operations have become inherently more dangerous in
recent years with the proliferation of illegal weapons available in the
streets of our city. Furthermore, the availability of beepers and cellular
phones provides for the possibility of instant communication between
those engaged in criminal enterprise. An undercover officer recently
testified that there was a standing $10,000 contract to kill undercover
police officers in the Red Hook, Brooklyn area. The combination of an
open courtroom, or even a partially closed courtroom combined with
the capability for instant communication could prove deadly to some
undercover officers or confidential witnesses.
I am mindful that the Court of Appeals has stated that "a trial
court's own impressions of the general vicissitudes of undercover
narcotics work do not suffice for closure." However, in a courtroom
confronted by an undercover officer or confidential witness concerned
for his safety, that is cold comfort.
Gerges, supra note 35, at 2 (citation omitted).
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Waller] have squarely rejected any per se rule that would allow
closure of the courtroom any time an active undercover officer
testifies."' 178 The district court in Okonkwo v Lacy179 explained
its rejection of a blanket rule for undercover officers:
[T]he bare finding that an undercover officer... believes
personal safety may be jeopardized from exposure of his or
her identity does not, in and of itself, satisfy the Supreme
Court's guidelines for the application of the Sixth Amend-
ment. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an imper-
missible per se rule and to open the door for over-utilized,
under-scrutinized courtroom closure. 18°
178 Report& Recommendation at 10-11, Brown, No. 94-CV-3253. Magistrate
Andrew J. Peck cited the following cases: Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571,
578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (justifying its holding as necessary to avoid "sanction[ing]
an impermissible per se rule"); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994)
("[R]ejecting state request to allow courtroom to be closed to defendant's
relations if they live or work in the same county where the undercover
operates."), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 778 (1995); Ip v. Henderson, 710 F. Supp.
915, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("'[T]he court may not enact aperse rule in favor of
closing the courtroom in certain instances."'); Jones, 683 F. Supp. at 923
("[R]eject[ing]per se rule for closure of trial for undercover testimony."); People
v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 442, 443, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 1032, 604
N.Y.S.2d 932, 935, 936 (1993) (explaining that a ruling based on the undercover
officer continued activity in the Bronx "'would in effect sanction a rule of per
se closure for undercover officers'); People v. Tapia, 207 A.D.2d 286, 287, 615
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1st Dep't) ("[N]ot[ing] that the New York Court of Appeals
in Martinez rejected per se rule."), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d
1228, 621 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1994); see also People v. Brown, 172 A.D.2d 844, 846,
847, 569 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210, 211 (2d Dep't 1991) (Balletta, J., dissenting)
(noting that although an undercover witness's identity must be kept secret,
particularly because criminals no longer hesitate to use deadly force against
police officers, "the Court of Appeals has yet to indicate that an officer's
undercover status per se warrants closure of the courtroom .... [U]nless and
until the Court of Appeals softens its stance ... I feel constrained to vote that
the trial court committed reversible error [in closing the courtroom].").
179 895 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
'SO Id. at 578. In Jones v. Henderson, for example, where the only evidence
in support of closure was that the undercover agent "was, at that time [of trial],
still working in an undercover capacity," the court ruled that the "overriding
interest" prong of Waller was not satisfied. 683 F. Supp. at 923. To justify
closure, the court ruled, the state must offer "specific evidence which demon-
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Therefore, in order to determine if the prosecution has satisfied
the first prong of the Waller test, a court must judge whether there
is a "link" between the undercover officer's concerns for personal
safety and the officer's testimony in open court in the particular
case, 18 indicated by "spatial and temporal factual support for the
officer's concerns."' 82 Important evidence regarding this link is
the scope of the geographical area in which the officer is working
undercover." 3 The scope of the geographical area indicates the
likelihood that a spectator observing the trial would pose a danger
to the officer or ongoing undercover investigations. 84 In contrast
with other New York case law, 85 both the Second Circuit and the
strate[s] the compelling character of this interest under the particular circum-
stances of [this] trial." Id.
Similarly, in Ip v. Henderson, the court ruled that the trial court may not
rely on "general findings that would apply to almost any witness." 710 F. Supp.
915, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court criticized the trial judge's reliance on "the
witness's assertion that he feared for his life, rather than considering the
individual circumstances of the case. . . ." Id. The only evidence in support of
closure was that the witness, who was cooperating with the government, testified
that he feared for his safety. Id. at 918. Instead, "[tihe facts of each case must
be evaluated individually." Id. The court stressed that in assessing whether there
is an overriding interest, "the court may not enact a per se rule in favor of
closing the courtroom in certain instances, rather, the trial judge must look to the
particular circumstances of each case." Id. Other courts applying Waller have
agreed that "[i]nquiries and findings supporting closure must be made on a case-
by-case basis; they must be tailored to factual and circumstantial particulars."
Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 577; Ip, 710 F. Supp. at 918; see also Ayala, 1995
WL 373419, at *3 ("Courts must evaluate the facts of each case individually and
make determinations regarding closure on a case-by-case basis.").
8 ' People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 443, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 604
N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (1993).
182 People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1 st Dep't), appeal denied,
86 N.Y.2d 788, 656 N.E.2d 601, 632 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1995).
113 Report & Recommendation at 11-12, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-
3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
114 Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
778 (1995).
' People v. Miller, 190 A.D.2d 609, 609, 593 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813 (1st
Dep't) (upholding closure where, inter alia, officers were testifying in Manhattan
and the crime occurred in Brooklyn "given the proximity and ease of access
between the two counties ... especially in light of the substantial number of
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New York courts applying the Waller test have held that "testimony
that an officer still works undercover in an area as large as a
borough does not justify closure. . . . Rather, closure will be
justified only if the officer still works undercover in a narrow
geographic area near where the defendant was arrested or lives or
where the trial is occurring." '86
narcotics cases from the five counties of the City of New York being tried in the
Central Narcotics Parts in New York County"), appeal denied, 81 N.Y.2d 974,
615 N.E.2d 232, 598 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1993) ; People v. Brown, 172 A.D.2d 844,
846, 569 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210 (2d Dep't 1991) (upholding closure where the
witness had been working elsewhere for eight months, and "reasonably expected
that she would be working in the same community where she was about to
testify" because she had applied for a transfer).
186 Report & Recommendation at 11-12, Brown, No. 94-CV-3253; People v.
Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 443, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936
(1993); People v. Tapia, 207 A.D.2d 286, 287, 615 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1st
Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d 1228, 621 N.Y.S.2d 528
(1994). For example, in Vidal v. Williams, the court ruled that evidence that the
undercover officer continued to work in the Bronx and the defendant's family
also lived in the Bronx was insufficient to justify closure to defendant's family
members. Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 778 (1995). The court reasoned that:
[T]he Bronx covers 41 square miles and has 1.2 million residents ....
A chance meeting somewhere in the Bronx was unlikely. The exclusion
was not justified .... In New York City, two locations three miles
apart are hardly in the same vicinity. Almost seventy percent of the
Bronx and 830,000 people could fit within three miles of [the site of
the arrest] .... Given the scope of the drug problem in the Bronx,
there is minimal risk that two people who happen to live near a high
drug area will have a chance meeting with a specific undercover
officer working throughout the borough.
Id; see also Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
936 (upholding closure in companion case where undercover officer worked at
the Port Authority in Manhattan, the site of defendant's arrest); People v. Rivera,
632 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (1st Dep't 1995) (ruling that the undercover officer's
current assignment in Manhattan's 34th precinct, ("155th to 203rd Streets") was
not in the "same vicinity" as East 100th Street, the site of the arrest, under Vidal
v. Williams); People v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d 742, 743, 616 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620
(1st Dep't) (upholding closure where the undercover officer continued to work
"in the vicinity of Broadway between 31st and 33rd Streets," the site of
defendant's arrest), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d 126, 622
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994); People v. Skinner, 204 A.D.2d 664, 664, 612 N.Y.S.2d
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The state can present strong evidence supporting closure where
the undercover officer will return to the exact location of the arrest
to continue undercover operations. Under such circumstances, a
court may permit closure if the undercover officer fears that one of
the defendant's friends involved in the officer's open drug
operations "might" be present in the courtroom,187 or if the
officer does not know whether the defendant's friends or family
might be involved in the drug trade in the neighborhood, even if
the defendant is not tied to such open investigations."18
In determining whether there is the necessary "overriding
interest" needed to satisfy the first prong of Waller, the court may
also consider specific evidence that reveals the degree to which the
officer has been exposed to the public and indicates the "value or
effectiveness of closure."'' 9 The court may consider the ease of
419, 420 (2d Dep't) (ruling closure was proper where drug sale "occurred at
150th Street and Beaver Road, Queens, the undercover officer had worked in that
neighborhood during the two weeks immediately prior to the defendant's trial,
and he would be returning to that neighborhood in his undercover capacity"),
appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 910, 645 N.E.2d 1227, 621 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1994).
Compare these holdings with People v. Miller, a case that does not apply
the Waller test. 190 A.D.2d 609, 593 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
81 N.Y.2d 974, 615 N.E.2d 232, 598 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1993). In Miller, the court
ruled that closure of the courtroom was proper where the undercover officers
worked in "the surrounding northern Brooklyn communities where defendant was
arrested," even though the officers testified in Manhattan. Id. at 609, 593
N.Y.S.2d at 813. The court stated:
That the officers were testifying in a Manhattan courtroom, rather than
one in Kings County where the crime allegedly occurred and the
officers are assigned, does not change the result given the proximity
and ease of access between the two counties, especially in light of the
substantial number of narcotics cases from the five counties of the City
of New York being tried in the Central Narcotics Parts in New York
County.
Id. (citation omitted).
187 People v. Dorcas, 630 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 87
N.Y.2d 845 (1995); People v. Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d 541, 542, 606 N.Y.S.2d 694,
695 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 963, 639 N.E.2d 756, 616 N.Y.S.2d
16 (1994).
's Aguayo, 200 A.D.2d at 542, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
189Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 577-78.
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transportation between the location of the arrest, the defendant's
home and the courthouse.' 90 Other relevant specific evidence
tending to satisfy the first prong of Waller is whether the under-
cover officer had received any threats in connection with testifying
at the trial or open investigations.19 Courts have also considered
whether the undercover officer "regularly took precautions to
conceal his or her identity,"1 92 such as whether the officer used
the public entrance to the courthouse,'93 used a public elevator
within the courthouse, 94 arrived at the courthouse in a marked
police car'95 or wore a uniform to court. 19 6 Courts also consider
the number of buy-and-bust operations in which the undercover
officer had participated during his or her career,' 97 the number of
times the officer expected to testify about other undercover
narcotics operations taking place near the drug sale at issue in
defendant's trial,' 98 the number of times the officer testified in
front of a grand jury 99 and whether the officer testified in open
190 People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
86 N.Y.2d 788, 656 N.E.2d 601, 632 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1995).
191 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 577 ("[A]n inquiry into specific threats against
the witness is of considerable importance to any determination affecting
closure."); Report & Recommendation at 13, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-
3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995) (recommending that closure is improper where,
inter alia, undercover officer "neither gave details of any specific threats nor
connected testifying at [petitioner's] trial with threats or danger to him").
192 People v. Rosario, 214 A.D.2d 345, 345, 625 N.Y.S.2d 19, 19 (1st Dep't)
(finding closure proper because the officer took such precautions), appeal denied,
86 N.Y.2d 801, 656 N.E.d 614, 632 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1995).
113 Id. (ruling that closure is proper where, inter alia, the undercover officer
"had utilized a non-public entrance to the courthouse"); see also Okonkwo, 895
F. Supp. at 578 (noting that the trial court erred by failing to inquire whether the
undercover officer arrived at the courthouse by police car, whether he entered the
courtroom through a public or private entrance and whether he wore a uniform
to court).
' Court Is Closed to Public to Shield Undercover Agent, 209 N.Y. L.J. 25
(1993) [hereinafter Court Is Closed].
"' Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 578.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 577.
'9' Court Is Closed, supra note 194, at 25.
9 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 577.
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court.2"0 Further, in deciding to close the courtroom, a court may
find it compelling that the courtroom is in a part of the courthouse
regularly used to try narcotics cases.20 ' The above factors may
indicate "law enforcement's efforts to protect their undercover
officers and the number of people who pose a threat of exposing
the officer.,
20 2
B. The Second and Third Prongs: Breadth and Alternatives
The second and third prongs of Waller require that closure "be
no broader than necessary to protect" the government's interest, and
that the court "consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding" to the public. 23 A common ground for appeal is that
the trial court erred by not considering less restrictive means of
protecting the undercover witness.20 4
After Waller, as the court in Ayala v Speckard °5 noted, "it
remains unclear whether the trial court or the party objecting to
closure has the burden of raising alternatives" 2 6 or making
suggestions of less broad means of closure for the trial court's
consideration. In Ayala, the court explicitly refused to impose a
burden on the courts to create alternatives sua sponte20 7 or to ask
the defendant whether he wanted specific spectators present.20 8
200 Daniel v. Kelly, No. CV-78-830E, 1990 WL 130523, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 31, 1990).
2'0 People v. Gross, 179 A.D.2d 138, 140, 583 N.Y.S.2d 832, 832-33 (1st
Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 832, 600 N.E.2d 643, 587 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1992).
202 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 577-78.
203 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
204 E.g., Report & Recommendation at 17, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-
3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995); Ayala v. Speckard, No. 94-CV-7850, 1995 WL
373419, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995); Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp at 578; People
v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d 742, 742-43, 616 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d 126, 622 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994).
205 No. 94-CV-7850, 1995 WL 373419 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995).
206 Ayala, 1995 WL 373419, at *4.
207 "Sua sponte" is defined as "[o]f his or its own will or motion; volun-
tarily; without prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th
ed. 1990).
208 Ayala, 1995 WL 373419, at *4.
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Other courts have been reluctant to create alternatives sua sponte
or to suggest less broad means of closure without clear authority to
do so. 2 9 The burden is therefore on the defendant to suggest
alternatives or request narrower means of closure.1 ° If the
defendant fails to raise alternatives or less broad means of closure,
and if no evidence of other reasonable options exist, a reviewing
court may not find error in the trial court's failure to propose
alternatives or less broad means of closure. 21 ' A reviewing court
may even bar a defendant's claim that the trial court failed to
consider alternatives or other options if the defendant did not
suggest or request other options at trial.21 2
Objections as to the breadth of closure commonly arise where
the defendant's family members are excluded from the courtroom
when it is closed to the public during the testimony of an under-
cover officer.213 Recently, the Second Circuit and the New York
209 Pearson v. James, No. 94-CV-1499, 1995 WL 617331, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 20, 1995); Martinez v. Sullivan, No. 88-CV-7335, 1989 WL 63103, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1990); People v. Martinez,
82 N.Y.2d 442, 443-44, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031-32, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936-37
(1993); People v. Badillo, 207 A.D.2d at 743, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
210 Report & Recommendation at 15, 17, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-
3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
211 E.g., Pearson, 1995 WL 617331, at *2 (ruling that trial court was not
required to "propose, sua sponte, alternative means" to closure where the
petitioner did not suggest any at trial and "there is no evidence that any
reasonable alternatives were available").
Some courts have ruled that the closure was "no broader than necessary"
simply because the trial court closed the courtroom only during the undercover
officer's testimony. E.g., Burton v. Senkowski, No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL
669908, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995) (ruling that closure was no broader than
necessary because "[t]he judge closed the trial only for the testimony of the
undercover officers whose identities needed protection").
22 Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp 571, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that
petitioner's claim that the trial court did not consider alternative to closure was
barred because the Appellate Division ruled that the defendant did not object on
this ground); Badillo, 207 A.D.2d at 743, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (ruling that
defendant's claim that trial court failed to consider "other, narrower means" to
protect the overriding interest was "waived" where defendant made no
"suggestions or requests").
213 Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
778 (1995); Report & Recommendation at 16, 17, Ayala, 1995 WL 373419, at
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Court of Appeals have reemphasized the Supreme Court's concern
that defendants have their family members present at trial, holding
that exclusion of a defendant's family members may exceed the
precautions necessary to protect the state's interest in assuring an
undercover officer's safety.214  In Vidal v Williams,"5  the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hold that "a courtroom
can be closed to a defendant's relatives as long as the relatives live
(or, presumably, work) in the county where the undercover officer
operates," particularly where the defendant's parents were not
inclined to harm or encounter the officer during an operation.
21 6
In People v. Gutierez,"7 the New York Court of Appeals upheld
closure to the general public, but held that the trial court's
exclusion of the "defendant's close family members was broader
than constitutionally tolerable." 218  The court stated that
"[a]lthough the undercover officer indicated that he feared his life
and ongoing drug investigations would be jeopardized, he never
claimed to hold those fears with respect to defendant's wife and
children and did not otherwise advance any valid ground for
excluding defendant's family during the officer's testimony.,
21 9
In the short time since the New York Court of Appeals' decision
in Gutierez, lower state courts have generally ruled that in order to
*4; Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995); People v.
Gutierez, 86 N.Y.2d 817, 818, 657 N.E.2d 491, 633 N.Y.S.2d 470, 470 (1995);
People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d
932, 936 (1993); People v. Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54, 58, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1044, 571
N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (1990); People v. Green, 627 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't
1995); People v. Ocasio, 628 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (1 st Dep't), appeal denied, 86
N.Y.2d 845, 658 N.E.2d 232, 634 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1995).
214 Gutierez, 86 N.Y.2d at 818, 657 N.E.2d at 491, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 470;
Vidal, 31 F.3d at 69 (excluding a defendant's parents from the courtroom during
an undercover officer's testimony is unjustified if the parents are not "inclined
to harm" the officer or "encounter him" during undercover operations). But cf
People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1st Dep't) ("[N]o further showing
was required simply because the exclusion affected a family member."), appeal
denied, 86 N.Y.2d 788, 656 N.E.2d 601, 632 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1995).
215 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 778 (1995).
216 Id. at 69.
217 86 N.Y.2d 817, 657 N.E.2d 491, 633 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1995).
2' Id. at 818, 657 N.E.2d at 491, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
219 Id.
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exclude a defendant's family members, the prosecutor must
establish that the family members live in or frequent an area in
very close proximity to the undercover officer's current area of
operations,22 and the officer must have specific concerns regard-
ing the family members.22' It remains unclear, however, whether
courts will follow the holding in Gutierez if the defendant does not
specifically request at trial that his or her family members remain
in the courtroom.222
220 People v. Navarro, 632 N.Y.S.2d 598, 598-99 (2d Dep't 1995) (ruling
that there was no evidence that defendant's mother visited Queens, the
undercover officer's area of operations, "for any purpose other than to attend her
son's trial").
221 People v. Green, 627 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't 1995) (ruling that the
state's reason for excluding the defendant's family and girlfriend, that they
"made the officer uncomfortable," was inadequate). When the defendant requests
that the trial court exempt certain people from the closure order, the prosecution
must prove that "those individuals threaten an overriding interest of the witness."
People v. Johnson, 635 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (2d Dep't 1995) (reversing conviction
where the record did not demonstrate that the defendant's family "posed a threat
to the undercover officer").
222 In Vidal, Kan and Gutierez, the defendants specifically requested that
their family members remain in the courtroom during the undercover officer's
testimony, and Vidal and Kan have been distinguished on that ground. The court
in Ayala v. Speckard distinguished Vidal on the ground that in Vidal, the
defendant requested that his parents remain in the courtroom, which was not the
case in Ayala. No. 94-CV-7850, 1995 WL 373419, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21,
1995). Similarly, in People v. Martinez, the court of appeals distinguished Kan
on the ground that in contrast to Kan, the defendant in Martinez had not
requested exemption of the closure order for particular friends and family. 82
N.Y.2d 442, 443, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (1993).
Generally, the defendant must specifically raise the issue at trial in order for
the court to consider excepting a defendant's family members from the closure
order. People v. Ocasio, 628 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 86
N.Y.2d 845, 658 N.E.2d 232, 634 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1995); People v. Badillo, 207
A.D.2d 742, 743, 616 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d
1009, 647 N.E.2d 126, 622 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1994); People v. Santos, 154 A.D.2d
284, 286, 546 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1st Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d
817, 551 N.E.2d 1245, 552 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1990). For example, in People v.
Bouche, defense counsel's mere suggestion that a family member "may be" in
court the following day was not a sufficient request that the trial court consider
exempting him from a closure order. 208 A.D.2d 445, 446, 617 N.Y.S.2d 715,
716 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 1009, 647 N.E.2d 127, 622 N.Y.S.2d
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New York courts have not focused attention on exploring other
alternatives to closure of courtroom proceedings where an under-
cover officer testifies as a witness. Options, however, exist that
would impose less strain on a defendant's right to a public trial
while still protecting the undercover witness from exposure. For
example, in the Eighth Circuit, where closure is not a general
practice, the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the use of a screen during the testimony of an undercover
officer was the most effective way to protect the identity of the
921 (1994). See also Report & Recommendation at 16, Brown v. Andrews, No.
94-CV-3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995):
Petitioner Brown did not notify the trial court that she wanted her
father to be present at trial and exempt from the closure order. The
only reference to her father was in a single question to the undercover
officer, as to whether his fears would be allayed "if [defense counsel]
told [the undercover witness] that since the trial began, we have had
no spectators here other than the defendant's father.". . .This question
suggests that there was no need to close the courtroom at all because
the trial was so sparsely attended; it does not squarely ask the trial
judge to consider exempting petitioner's father from a closure order.
... Accordingly, the trial court did not err in not exempting Brown's
father from the closure order.
Id.
In Gutierez, however, the New York Court of Appeals did not indicate
whether the defendant had requested an exception for his family. This suggests
that the New York Court of Appeals does not find it dispositive whether the
defendant requested that family members remain, and therefore requires trial
judges to consider exempting a defendant's family sua sponte when considering
a request to close the courtroom. However, like Gutierez, most courts reversing
convictions under Gutierez have not based their decisions on whether defendants
requested a family exemption; nor, however, have they decided that such request
is no longer required under Gutierez. People v. Carrington, 633 N.Y.S.2d 47, 47-
48 (2d Dep't 1995); People v. Pankey, 631 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (2d Dep't 1995).
Cf People v. Johnson, 635 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (2d Dep't 1995) ("When the
defendant seeks to limit closure to permit the attendance of certain individuals,
the People must present evidence that those individuals threaten an overriding
interest of the witness."); People v. Green, 633 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (2d Dep't
1995) (finding that closure was broader than necessary under Gutierez where
defendant objected to exclusion of family members). Thus, defendants should
specifically ask the trial court to exempt their family members from a closure
order.
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witness as well as the defendants' right to a public trial. 2 3 The
screen allowed spectators to hear the officer, but not to see her,
"while not interfering with the ability of the defendants, the court,
or the jury to see her when she testified. ' 224 In addition to the use
of a screen, 225 possible alternatives to closure alluded to by New
York courts in dicta include stationing a guard at the door226 and
limiting closure to spectators who habituate the area under
investigation by the undercover officer.227
223 United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 869, 112 S.Ct. 199 (1991).
224 Id.
225 Pearson v. James, No. 94-CV-1499, 1995 WL 617331, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 20, 1995); People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031-
32, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936-37 (1993).
226 Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d at 444, 624 N.E.2d at 1031-32, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
936-37.
227 People v. Bonet, 176 A.D.2d 641, 642, 575 N.Y.S.2d 294,295 (1st Dep't
1991) (finding unreasonable defendant's suggestion of "the deactivation or
relocation of the undercover officer"), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 853, 588 N.E.2d
760, 580 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1992). Despite the seeming lack of alternatives to
closure in New York, the court in Okonkwo v. Lacy emphasized that such
alternatives be explored because "an inquiry into the feasibility of disguise in the
field (and, perhaps, in court) is merited by the constitutional importance of this
issue." 895 F. Supp. 571, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). One may attribute this lack of
alternatives to closure to defendants' failure to make suggestions, and the
reluctance of trial judges to accept the responsibility. E.g., Burton v. Senkowski,
No. CV-94-3836, 1995 WL 669908, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1995) ("While
there is no indication in the record that the trial judge considered alternatives to
sealing the courtroom, neither were any alternatives presented to the court.");
Pearson v. James, No. 94-CV-1499, 1995 WL 61733 1, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,
1995); People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1031-32, 604
N.Y.S.2d 932, 936-37 (noting that where defendant made no requests,
alternatives to closure "might well be investigated in future cases, but on this
record the trial court did not err in failing to consider them"). New York State
Supreme Court Justice Gerges has noted that the alternative of closing the
courtroom to only some spectators, or partial closure, is apparently a "middle
ground" between the defendant's and witness's competing interests. Gerges,
supra note 35, at 2. However, Justice Gerges believes "it can have unforeseen
repercussions. The confidential witness' safety may still be jeopardized by the
individuals allowed to remain in the courtroom." Gerges, supra note 35, at 2. In
the Eastern District of New York, Chief Judge Charles P. Sifton expressed
disbelief in the existence of a suitable alternative to closure: "[T]here are no
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C. Adequate Findings and Appropriate Remedies
Waller's fourth prong requires the trial court to "make findings
adequate to support the closure. 228 These findings allow a
reviewing court to evaluate whether the court properly entered the
closure order.22 9 "[B]road and general" findings cannot justify
closure;23 ° instead, "the court must consider the individual facts
of the case."23' Accordingly, "the bare finding that an undercover
officer will continue to operate in a given area and believes
personal safety may be jeopardized from exposure of his or her
identity does not, in and of itself, satisfy the Supreme Court's
guidelines for the application of the Sixth Amendment., 232 In
order to make adequate findings that will survive review, a trial
court must "substantiate its assumptions" about both the defendant's
and the state's interests in a case.233
If, after examining the trial court's application of the four
prongs of the Waller test, a reviewing court finds that the closure
violated defendant's right to a public trial, Waller supports but does
feasible alternatives to sealing a courtroom when the purpose behind the sealing
is to secure testimony from undercover agents." Burton, 1995 WL 669908, at *3.
Although courts have noted inventive alternatives to closure, they have not been
instrumental in seeing that these alternatives are put into practice and thus
evaluated.
228 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984).
229 Report & Recommendation at 17, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-3253
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
230 Id. at 48.
231 Report & Recommendation at 18, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-3253
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995); see also Ip v. Henderson, 710 F. Supp. 915, 919
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 888 F.2d 1376 (2d Cir. 1989) (granting
petition for writ of habeas corpus where the courtroom was closed for an
accomplice witness who feared for his safety, but where there was no finding of
any specific grounds for this fear).
232 Okonkwo v. Lacy, 895 F. Supp. 571, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also
Report & Recommendation at 18, Brown, No. 94-CV-3253 (recommending that
the trial court's finding that "the undercover officer was still active in Manhattan,
and feared for his safety" did not justify closure).
233 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 579.
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not require a new trial. 3 The Supreme Court has ruled that
courts granting writs of habeas corpus are free "to fashion the
remedy as law and justice require, '' 235 when they find that closure
violated the defendant's right to a public trial. Yet most state and
federal courts finding closure improper have granted a new trial as
a remedy.
23 6
One recent decision, Okonkwo v Lacy,237 took a novel
approach to the question of remedy. Ruling that the state trial court
made insufficient findings to justify closure, the court granted a
conditional writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case to the trial
court for additional findings consistent with the requirements of
Waller.238 The Okonkwo court acknowledged, however, that the
trial court's lack of "well-reasoned findings .... [did] not neces-
sarily mean that the government's interest was insufficient to merit
closure in this case. 239 Instead, the lack of findings signified that
the record itself was simply insufficient to support closure.24 °
Therefore, on remand, the court directed the trial judge to "issue
234 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984) (ordering a new suppression
hearing as opposed to a new trial because "the remedy should be appropriate to
the violation").
235 Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1989); see also
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1968) ("The federal habeas corpus
statute ... does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the
applicant from physical custody. Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief
that may be granted.").
236 The following cases granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus
permitting a new trial: Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 778 (1995); Ip v. Henderson, 710 F. Supp 915, 919
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 888 F.2d 1376 (2d Cir. 1989); Jones v.
Henderson, 683 F. Supp. 917, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also People v. Martinez,
82 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 642 N.E.2d 1027, 1032, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 937 (1993)
(ordering new trial). But cf Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 (granting new suppression
hearing where public trial violation only occurred during suppression hearing).
237 895 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
238 Id. at 579. The findings were insufficient because the trial court "did not
substantiate its assumptions about the officer's and the government's interests."
Id.
239 Id. at 577.
240 id.
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explicit findings."24' If the findings justify the closure, "the writ
shall not issue. Alternatively, if the findings compel the conclusion
that closure was improper, or if sufficient evidence cannot be
adduced at the hearing, then the petition shall be granted." '242
This remedy, which one United States magistrate also recom-
mended in a pending habeas corpus petition,2 43 has a number of
advantages. First, it allows the state trial court to make reviewable
findings on the record.244 Second, if the trial court determines
that it appropriately closed the courtroom under Waller, it prevents
the petitioner from gaining the windfall of a new trial.2 45 Most
importantly, this remedy adheres to "general notions of comity," by
giving a state court "an opportunity to correct its own error. 246
This remedy of a conditional writ is perhaps the most compelling
way to ensure that state courts will apply the Waller test-if they
fail to apply the standards of Waller during trial, federal courts will
force them to redo the inquiry on habeas corpus review.
New York courts must not continue to ignore Waller in favor
of supporting closure where an undercover officer presently works
on pending investigations in the same general geographical area of
the arrest or trial or by applying other lax standards.247 Prosecu-
tors will find it extremely easy to satisfy such basic requirements.
Undercover officers are often assigned to teams that initiate
hundreds of buy-and-bust operations in one wide geographical area
241 Id. at 579.
242 Id.
243 Report & Recommendation at 18-19, Brown v. Andrews, No. 94-CV-
3253 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995). Both the petitioner and the state have filed
objections.
244 Okonkwo, 895 F. Supp. at 581.
245 Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984)).
246 Id. at 581 (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, (1950)) ("[lIt
would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court
to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation."). The principle of comity "is that courts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state
or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual
respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
247 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing the varying
standards for closure applied by lower New York State courts).
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
for an extended period of time.248 In every one of these cases, the
officers can testify that they will return to the area of the arrest to
continue further undercover operations. Closure during the most
critical point of the trial will become the rule in a vast number of
very low-level criminal trials, often involving drugs worth as little
as ten or twenty dollars.249 Such a standard does not give proper
weight to the defendant's right to a public trial.
Even though active undercover officers certainly face serious
dangers,"' courts must not assume that the level of danger merits
closure of the courtroom in every case. Risks from public testimony
should not be assumed; rather, they should be substantiated by fact.
The Waller test requires a searching inquiry that will reveal the
exact circumstances of the undercover officer's activity in relation
to the case. In applying the test, the trial court may learn, for
example, that the dangers that the undercover officer faces are not
due to public testimony, but are caused by other factors. The
inquiry may reveal that the undercover officer is active in such a
large or populous geographical area that the probability of exposure
due to public testimony in a particular case is remote. Such
specificity, which is rejected by a per se rule, is necessary to
safeguard the defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. The
Waller test, which allows the trial court to evaluate whether closure
is proper based on extensive factual analysis, rejects this pre-
sumption of danger and reaffirms the presumption of an open trial
granted by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
New York, unlike any other jurisdiction, routinely permits
closure during the testimony of undercover officers. The caselaw
248 E.g., Report & Recommendation at 3, Brown, N. 94-CV-3253 ("Officer
Fisher testified that during his twenty-one months as an undercover police officer
assigned to Manhattan North Narcotics, he had made approximately 250 narcotics
purchases in New York County, and had 'about 100, 150' open narcotics cases
currently under investigation.").
249 E.g., id. at 2 (petitioner convicted of selling $10.00 of crack cocaine to
an undercover officer).
250 See supra note 73 (describing risks faced by undercover officers).
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confirms that New York's loose standards regarding the closure of
trial proceedings result in inconsistencies, and possibly, an
impermissible per se rule for closure. New York must adopt a
standard that protects the competing interests of an undercover
officer's fear for safety and a defendant's right to a public trial.
The Supreme Court's decision in Waller v Georgia provides an
adequate test for balancing these interests. Although lower courts
have yet to fully interpret the Court's test, it outlines a stringent,
fact-sensitive analysis that ensures that trial judges will seal
courtrooms if and only if the circumstances warrant closure. This
Note recommends that the New York State courts follow the
example of the Second Circuit and its own Court of Appeals and
consistently adopt Waller as a controlling standard. Until this is
accomplished, this Note recommends that where state courts are
remiss, reviewing courts should follow Okonkwo v Lacy and
remand cases to the trial court for application of the stricter Waller
test. It is plain that unless courts accept the Waller test in full, New
York State courts will continue to violate a defendant's right to a
public trial in favor of dangers to undercover officers that they
anticipate but do not substantiate. New York State courts can only
fully evaluate the extent of danger to undercover witnesses and
fairly determine whether this danger merits an exception to the
defendant's right to a public trial by applying the stringent
standards set out in Waller.

